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United States Constitution
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

United States Constitution
SIXTH AMENDMENT
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.

United States Constitution
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
SECTION 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Constitution of Utah
Article 1, Section 7
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
1896

Constitution of Utah
Article 1, Section 13
1

It i I J. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be
prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate,
unless the examination be waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by
indictment, with or without such examination and commitment The formation of
the grand jury and the powers and duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the
Legislature.
January 1,1949

Constitution of Utah
Article 1, Section 24
Sec 24« [Uniform operation of laws*]
All laws of a general nature shall havr niiiloi in t >poi4ition.
1896
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Constitution of Utah
Article 6, Section 28
Sec 28. [Special privileges forbidden.]
The Legislature shall not delegate to any special commission, private
corporation or association, any power to make, supervise or interfere with any
municipal improvement, money, property or effects, whether held in trust or
otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a capitol site, or to perform any municipal
functions.
November 7,1972

Constitution of Utah
Article 8, Section 1
Sec. 1. [Judicial powers — Courts.]
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in a trial
court of general jurisdiction known as the district court, and in such other courts as
the Legislature by statute may establish. The Supreme Court, the district court, and
such other courts designated by statute shall be courts of record. Courts not of record
shall also be established by statute.
July 1,1985

DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS
History: Const. 1896.
Compiler's Notes. — The quotation marks
at the end of this section have been carried in
brackets in all compilations since Revised Statutes of 1898.

3BEArt. V, § 1

Cross-References. — Oaths of officers,
§ 52-1-1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Bond required in addition to oath.
Formal ritual unnecessary.
Supreme Court justices required to take oath.
Bond required in addition to oath.
Statute requiring state treasurer to give
bond is not unconstitutional on ground that
Legislature could not add to requirement in
this section. State ex rel. Stain v. Chnstensen,

of oath form duly notarized by a deputy county
clerk (a person duly authorized to administer
oaths) although he did not go through some
formal ritual, with the raising of his right
h a n d S t a t e v Mathews, 13 Utah 2d 391, 375
p 2d 392
(1962).
S u p r e m e C o u r t j u s t i C e s required to take
oath
J u d eg of ^
S u p r e m e C o u r t s u b s cribe to
. . . "°., ,
„„;„..;.,„ „„„„ f u„;, J„* ; ^ 0

Formal ritual unnecessary.
A deputy county recorder took the oath of
office, required by this section, by his signing

794. For sequel to this case, see State ex rel.
Jugler v. Grover, 102 Utah 459, 132 P.2d 125
(1942).

SScS^ v^nLTiS! %£& i3diuS

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Officers and Public Employees § 46.
Key Numbers. — Officers *=» 36(1).

ARTICLE V
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS
Section
1. [Three departments of government.]

Section 1. [Three departments of government.]
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial;
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of
these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the
others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.
History: Const. 1896.
Cross-References. — Executive department, Utah Const., Art. VII.
Judicial department, Utah Const., Art. VIII.

Legislative department, Utah Const., Art.
VI.
Municipal powers not delegable, Utah
Const., Art. VI, § 28.
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Art. VIII, § 6

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 6. [Number of judges of district court and other
courts — Divisions.]
The number of judges of the district court and of other courts of record
established by the Legislature shall be provided by statute. No change in the
number of judges shall have the effect of removing a judge from office during a
judge's term of office. Geographic divisions for all courts of record except the
Supreme Court may be provided by statute. No change in divisions shall have
the effect of removing a judge from office during a judge's term of office.
History: Const. 1896; L. 1943, S.J.R. 2;
Cross-References. — Geographical divi1984 (2nd S.S.), S.J.R. 1.
sions, § 78-1-2.1.
Compiler's Notes. — Provisions similar to
Statutory provisions, § 78-2-1 et seq
those in this section were formerly found in
Venue, § 78-13-1 et seq.
Art. VIII, Sees. 5, 6, and 8. Former Sec. 16 es/
iA
/ / / / \/lH £J/^~
tablished the geographical composition of the
/ A
I fl^\'0*\
fji^V^'f^tCtS

Legislative increase in number of judges.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
Act of 1903, which increased number of Error §§ 1, 4.
judges in third judicial district from three to
C.J.S. — 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §§ 18 to
four, empowered governor to appoint one judge 22; 21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 291, 466.
in and for such district, etc., held valid e x e r u § e ^ _ A . L . R . — P1*ce of holding sessions of trial
of legislative power. State ex rel. Breeden v. ^ ^ r t as afTecting validity of its proceedings, 18
Lewis, 26 Utah 120, 72 P. 388 (1903).
' A^R.3d 572^
Key Numbers. — Courts <s= 156.

\

Sec. 7. [Qualifications of justices and judges.]
Supreme Court justices shall be at least 30 years old, United States citizens,
Utah residents for five years preceding selection, and admitted to practice law
in Utah. Judges of other courts of record shall be at least 25 years old, United
States citizens, Utah residents for three years preceding selection, and admitted to practice law in Utah. If geographic divisions are provided for any court,
judges of that court shall reside in the geographic division for which they are
selected.
History: Const. 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.),
S.J.R. 1.
Compiler's Notes. — Provisions similar to

those in this section were formerly found in
Art. VIII, Sec. 2.

Sec. 8. [Vacancies — Nominating commissions — Senate
approval.]
When a vacancy occurs in a court of record, the governor shall fill the
vacancy by appointment from a list of at least three nominees certified to the
governor by the Judicial Nominating Commission having authority over the
vacancy. The governor shall fill the vacancy within 30 days after receiving the
list of nominees. If the governor fails to fill the vacancy within the time
prescribed, the chief justice of the Supreme Court shall within 20 days make
the appointment from the list of nominees. The Legislature by statute shall
provide for the nominating commissions, composition and procedures. No
member of the Legislature may serve as a member of, nor may the Legislature
192

Constitution of Utah
Article 11, Section 5
Sec. 5. [Municipal corporations — To be created by general law — Right
and manner of adopting charter for own government — Powers included.]
Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be created by special laws.
The legislature by general laws shall provide for the incorporation, organization and
classification of cities and towns in proportion to population, which laws may be
altered, amended or repealed Any incorporated city or town mayframeand adopt a
charter for its own government in the following manner
The legislative authority of the city may, by two-thirds vote of its members,
and upon petition of qualified electors to the number of fifteen per cent of all votes
cast at the next preceding election for the office of the mayor, shall forthwith provide
by ordinance for the submission to the electors of the question: "Shall a commission
be chosen to frame a charter?" The ordinance shall require that the question be
submitted to the electors at the next regular municipal election. The ballot
containing such question shall also contain the names of candidates for members of
the proposed commission, but without party designation. Such candidates shall be
nominated in the same manner as required by law fornomination of city officers. If a
majority of the electors voting on the question of choosing a commission shall vote
in the affirmative, then the fifteen candidates receiving a majority of the votes cast at
such election, shall constitute the charter commission, and shall proceed toframea
charter.
Any charter soframedshall be submitted to the qualified electors of the city
at an election to be held at a time to be determined by the charter commission, which
shall be not less than sixty days subsequent to its completion and distribution among
the electors and not more than one yearfromsuch date. Alternative provisions may
also be submitted to be voted upon separately. The commission shall make
provisions for the distribution of copies of the proposed charter and of any
alternative provisions to the qualified electors of the city, not less than sixty days
before the election at which it is voted upon. Such proposed charter and such
alternative provisions as are approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon,
shall become an organic law of such city at such time as may be fixed therein, and
shall supersede any existing charter and all laws affecting the organization and
government of such city which are now in conflict therewith. Within thirty days
after its approval a copy of such charter as adopted, certified by the mayor and city
recorder and authenticated by the seal of such city, shall be made in duplicate and
deposited, one in the office of the secretary of S tate and the other in the office of the
city recorder, and thereafter all courts shall take judicial notice of such charter.

Amendments to any such charter may be framed and submitted by a charter
commission in the same manner as provided for making of charters, or may be
proposed by the legislative authority of the city upon a two-thirds vote thereof, or by
petition of qualified electors to a number equal tofifteenper cent of the total votes
cast for mayor on the next preceding election, and any such amendment may be
submitted at the next regular municipal election, and having been approved by the
majority of the electors voting thereon, shall become part of the charter at the time
fixed in such amendment and shall be certified and filed as provided in case of
charters.
Each city forming its charter under this section shall have, and is hereby
granted, the authority to exercise all powers relating to municipal affairs, and to
adopt and enforce within its limits, local police, sanitary and similar regulations not
in conflict with the general law, and no enumeration of powers in this constitution or
any law shall be deemed to limit or restrict the general grant of authority hereby
conferred; but this grant of authority shall not include the power to regulate public
utilities, not municipally owned, if any such regulation of public utilities is provided
for by general law, nor be deemed to limit or restrict the power of the legislature in
matters relating to State affairs, to enact general laws applicable alike to all cities of
the State.
The power to be conferred upon the cities by this section shall include the
following:
(a) To levy, dssoss and collect taxes and borrow money, within the limits
prescribed by general law, and to levy and collect special assessments for benefits
conferred.
(b) To furnish all local public services, to purchase, hire, construct, own,
maintain and operate, or lease, public utilities local in extent and use; to acquire by
condemnation, or otherwise, within or without the corporate limits, property
necessary for any such purposes, subject to restrictions imposed by general law for
the protection of other communities; and to grant local public utility franchises and
within its powers regulate the exercise thereof.
(C) To make local public improvements and to acquire by condemnation, or
otherwise, property within its corporate limits necessary for such improvements;
and also to acquire an excess over than [that] needed for any such improvement and
to sell or lease such excess property with restrictions, in order to protect and preserve
the improvement
(d) To issue and sell bonds on the security of any such excess property, or of
any public utility owned by the city, or of the revenues thereof, or both, including, in
the case of public utility, a franchise stating the terms upon which, in case of
foreclosure, the purchaser may operate such utility,
January 1,1933

Constitution of Utah
Article 8, Section 2
Sec 2. [Supreme court — Chief justice — Declaring law unconstitutional
—Justice unable to participate.]
The Supreme Court shall be the highest court and shall consist ofat least five
justices. Thenumberofjustices may be changedbystatute,but no changeshall have
the effect of removing a justice from office. A chief justice shall be selected from
among the justices of the Supreme Court as provided by statute. The chief justice
may resign as chiefjustice withoutresigning from the Supreme Court The Supreme
Court by rule may sit and render final judgment either en banc or in divisions. The
court shall not declare any law unconstitutional under this constitution or the
Constitution of the United States, except on the concurrence of a majority of all
justices of the Supreme Court. If a justice of the Supreme Court is disqualified or
otherwise unable toparticipate in a cause before the court, the chief justice, or in the
eventthechiefjustice is disqualified or unable to participate, the remainingjustices,
shall call an active judge from an appellate court or the district court to participate in
the cause.
January 1,1945
July 1,1985

Constitution of Utah
Article 8, Section 3
Sec 3. [Jurisdiction of Supreme Court]
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United States.
The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be
exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue all writs and orders necessary
formeexei^iseofmeSupremeCoiirt'sjurisdictionormec^mpletedetenninationof
any cause.
July 1,1985
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nor-elect who fails to take office, the powers and duties of the Governor shall devolve upon the Lieutenant Governor until the disability ceases or until the
next general election, when the vacancy shall be
filled bv election. If. during a vacancy in the office of
Governor, the Lieutenant Governor resigns, dies, is
removed, or becomes incapable of performing the duties of the office, the President of the Senate shall act
as Governor until the vacancy is filled or disability
ceases. If in this case the President of the Senate resigns, dies, is removed, or becomes incapable of performing the duties of the office, the Speaker of the
House shall act as Governor until the vacancy is
filled or disability ceases. While performing the duties of the Governor as provided in this section, the
Lieutenant Governor, the President of the Senate, or
the Speaker of the House, as the case may be, shall be
entitled to the salary' and emoluments of the Governor, except in cases of temporary disability.
The disability of the Governor or person acting as
Governor shall be determined by either a written declaration transmitted to the Supreme Court by the
Governor stating an inability to discharge the powers
and duties of the office or by a majority of the Supreme Court on joint request of the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Such determination shall be final and conclusive. Thereafter, when the Governor transmits to the
Supreme Court a written declaration that no disability exists, the Governor shall resume the powers and
duties of the office unless the Supreme Court, upon
joint request of the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, or upon its
own initiative, determines that the Governor is unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office.
The Lieutenant Governor shall then continue to discharge these powers and duties as acting Governor.
The Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all questions arising under this section. 1979
Sec. 12.

[Board of Pardons and Parole — Appointment — P o w e r s and p r o c e d u r e s
— Governor's powers and duties —
Legislature's powers.!
(1) There is created a Board of Pardons and Parole.
The Governor shall appoint the members of the board
with the consent of the Senate. The terms of office
shall be as provided by statute.
12) fa) The Board of Pardons and Parole, by majority vote and upon other conditions as provided by
statute, may grant parole, remit fines, forfeitures
and restitution orders, commute punishments,
and grant pardons after convictions, in all cases
except treason and impeachments, subject to regulations as provided by statute
(b) A fine, forfeiture, or restitution order may
not be remitted and a commutation, parole, or
pardon mav not be trranted except after a full
hea ring before the board, in open session, and
after previous notice of the time and place of the
hearing has been given.
f
c> The proceedings and decisions of the hoard,
the reasons therefor in each case, and the dissent
of any member who may disagree shall be recorded and filed as provided by statute with all
papers used upon the hearing.
^ lai The Governor may grant respites or reprieves in all cases of convictions for offenses
against the state except treason or conviction on
lr
npeachment. These respites or reprieves may
n
ot extend beyond the next session of the board.
At that session, the board shall continue or deter-

Art. VII, § 20

mine the respite or reprieve, commute the punishment, or pardon the offense as provided in this
section.
(b) In case of conviction for treason, the Governor may suspend execution of the sentence until
the case is reported to the Legislature at its next
annual general session, when the Legislature
shall pardon or commute the sentence, or direct
its execution. If the Legislature takes no action
on the case before adjournment of that session,
the sentence shall be executed.
1992
Sec. 13.

(Repealed.1

1992

Sec. 14. (Duties of Lieutenant Governor.!
The Lieutenant Governor shall:
(1) serve on all boards and commissions in lieu
of the Governor whenever so designated by the
Governor;
(2) perform such duties as may be delegated by
the Governor; and
(3) perform other duties as may be provided by
statute.
1992
Sec. 15.

(Duties of State Auditor and State
Treasurer.!
(1) The State Auditor shall perform financial post
audits of public accounts except as otherwise provided
by this Constitution.
12) The State Treasurer shall be the custodian of
public moneys.
(3) Each shall perform other duties as provided by
statute.
1992
Sec. 16. (Duties of Attorney General.!
The Attorney General shall be the legal adviser of
the State officers, except as otherwise provided by
this Constitution, and shall perform such other duties
as provided by law.
1979
Sec. 17.

[Repealed.1

1986

Sec. 18.

(Compensation of state and local officers.J
(1) The Governor, Lieutenant Governor, State Auditor, State Treasurer, Attorney General, and any
other state officer as the Legislature may provide,
shall receive for their services a fixed and definite
compensation as provided by law.
(2) (a) The compensation provided for in Subsection (1) shall be in full for all services rendered
by those officers in any official capacity or employment during their terms of office.
(b» An officer may not receive for the performance of any official duty any fee for personal
use, but all fees fixed by the Legislature for the
performance by any of them of any official duty
shall be collected in advance and deposited with
the appropriate treasury.
(ci The Legislature may provide for the payment of actual and necessary expenses of those
officers while traveling in the performance of official duties.
1992
Sec. 19. ( G r a n t s and c o m m i s s i o n s . !
Ail grants and commissions shall be in the name
and by tht- authority of the State of Utah, sealed with
the Great Seal of the State, signed by the Governor.
and countersigned bv such officer as provided bv law.
1979

Sec. 20. IThe Great Seal.)
There shall be a seal of the State, which shall be
called "The Great Seal of the State of Utah." and
shall be kept by such officer as provided by law. 1979

Laws of Utah - 1992
REPEALS:
ARTICLE VII SEC 13
ARTICLE XXI, SEC 1
ARTICLE XXI, SEC 2
Be it revolted bv the Legislature of the state of Utah,
tu o-thirds ofall members elected to each of the tu o
houses toting in faior thereof
S e c t i o n 1. It is p r o p o s e d to a m e n d Article
VI, S e c . 32, Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n , to read:
Sec 32 [Appointment of additional emplovees —
Legal counsel ]
<1> The Legislature may appoint temporary or
permanent nonmember emplovees for work during
and between sessions! including independently
(2) The Legislature mav appoint legal counsel
which shall provide and control all legal services for
the Legislature [except as the Legislature by low
shall authorize performance thereof by the attorney
general] unless otherwise provided by statute
S e c t i o n 2. It is p r o p o s e d to a m e n d Article
VII, Sec. 1, Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n , to read:
Sec 1 [Executive Department officers — Terms,
residence, and duties )
(1) The elective constitutional officers of the Ex
ecutive Department shall consist of Governor Lieutenant Governor State Auditor State Treasurer,
and Attorney General!, each of whom]_
(2) Each officer shall
(a) hold office for four year&l ] beginning on the
first Monday of January next after their election!
The officers of the Executive Department,!
(b) during their terms of office! shall 1 reside within the state, and [shall keep the public records,
books and papcro aa provided by law They ohalll
(c) perform such duties as are prescribed b> this
Constitution and as provided by [law] statute
S e c t i o n 3. It is p r o p o s e d to a m e n d Article
VII, Sec. 2, Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n , to read:
Sec 2 [Election of officers — Governor and Lieu
tenant Governor elected jointly j
(1) The officers provided for in Section {eneof-tkts
artielel 1_ shall be elected bv the qualified voters of
the state at the time and place of voting for members
of the Legislature!-€tfvd4he-pefaonsl The candidates respective!) having the highest number of
votes cast for the office voted for shall be electedl
but tfl If two or more is4vall) candidates have an
equal and the highest number of votes for anv one of
hatdl thie offices the two houses of the
eiMa
turei | at its next sessionl I shall elect [forthwith! b>
joint ballot one of Isueh -person** 1 those candidates
for [ ^aid I that office
^2) In the electionl I the names of the candidates
for Governor and Lieutenant Governor for each po
htical partv shall appear together on the ballot!,1
and the votes cast for a candidate for Governor shall

be considered as also cast for the candidate for UJH^
tenant Governor
t«k
S e c t i o n 4. It is p r o p o s e d to a m e n d Article ' 1
VII, S e c . 3, U t a h C o n s t i t u t i o n , to read* ^ S
Sec 3 [Qualifications of officers 1

-i

U) To be eligible for the office of Governor or UeiK
tenant Governor a person shall fhnvo "Mnmcdtki
etgc of thirty 1 be 30 years of age or older at thetimeof
election
(2] To be eligible for the office of Attorney General
a person shnllf nt thMim^ftfrlrrtion, hnvr nUuined
fc^cage of twentv five] be 25 > ears of age or older i t
the time of election, [eel admitted to practice before
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, and [be] in
good standing at the b2r
"
• Vl *
(3) To be eligible for the office of State Auditor
State Treasurer a person shall be 25 years of agoof^
older at the time of election
"
"~ \ * * f

'*¥§
<4) No person [shall bcl is eligible to any oftheoj^
fices provided for in Section 1 [of thio article J unlet**]
at the time of election that person is a qualified vStftfj
and [shall have] has been a resident citizen o f l w t
state for five years next preceding the election?^*]
S e c t i o n 5. It is p r o p o s e d to a m e n d Article v * **
VII, S e c . 5, U t a h C o n s t i t u t i o n , to read: £&*
Sec 5 [Executive power vested in Governor *i-]
Duties — Legal counsel ]
(1) The executive power of the state shall be vested
m the Governor! T J w h o shall see that the laws are
faithfully executed
»* »<'

«
(2) The Governor shall transact all executiveb\
ness with the officers of the government, civil
military, and may require information in writanjM
from the officers of the Executive Department, asg^
from the officers and managers of state i n s t i t u t i o n
upon any subject relating to the condition, managij^
ment, and expenses of their respective offices aj)jjU
mstitutions[r«ndl The Governor may at any tTO|j
when the Legislature is not in sessiontr^wayj, jvj
deemed necessary, appoint a committee to inv95$Sjrj
gate and report to the Governor upon the conditjop»
of any executive office or state institution
,^j
(3) The Governor shall communicate by message
the condition of the state to the Legislature at*
^
recomm
I regular 1 annual general session!,) and
^p^
such measures as may be deemed expedient
<F ^

A

(4) The Governor may appoint legal counseUoajfrvise the Governor
*<tik\
S e c t i o n 6. It is p r o p o s e d to amend Article ^
VII, S e c . 12, U t a h C o n s t i t u t i o n , to read: ^ Sec 12 [Board of Pardons and Parole — A P P ^
ment — Powers and procedures — Governor s pow^
er s and duties — Legislature's powers 1
[Until otherwise provided-fey 4«wtkrettees-of-thc Supreme Court-an^M^
A > *»W>r>ll J->/•««-./->».••.«^^> 1
c*« 9 f t t x f t v U M a t l t U M J )

$

< 1) There is created a Board of Pardons! "**&&
•-^JJ
*A-^whe^,-m<?kidH^^
rijj

(2) perform such duties as may be delegated by t he
Governor!,J; and jshaH]

norj. I shall appoint the members of the board with
the consent of the Senate The terms of office shall
be as provided by statute.
(2Ha)The Board of Pardons and Parole, by major- I
ity vote and upon (s«eb I other conditions as j may be I
e&tabkshedl provided by [the-Legrelaturel statute,
m a y grant parole, remit fines, (etftdl forfeitures, and
restitution orders, commute punishments, and j
grant pardons after convictions, in all cases except !
treason and impeachments, subject to Isueh] regulations as | may be) provided by I low, relative to-the

(b) A fine lor], forfeiture (shatij, or restitution order may not be remitted!-J and (no] a commutation,
parole, or pardon may not be granted!, 1 except after
a full hearing before the board, in open session, and I
after previous notice of the time and place of [stiehj
the hearing has been given.

' 1» serve on all boards and commissions in lieu of
the Governor whenever so designated by the CovernorL^halll;

(1) The State Auditor shall perform financial post
audits of public accounts!;] except as otherwise provided by this Constitution!, and the].
(2; The State Treasurer shall be the custodian of
public moneys!; and eaeh]_
(3) Each shall perform [aueh] other duties as provided by I lew] statute.

(1) The Governor, Lieutenant Governor, S t a t e Auditor, State Treasurer, Attorney General, and [saeh]
any other state [and District officers] officer as [previdcd for by law] the Legislature may provide, shall
receive for their services a fixed and definite compensation as [fixed] provided by law.
(2 X a) The compensation provided for [said officers
as provided in all laws cnaetcd p u r s u a n t to this Constitution, } in Subsection (1) shall be in full for all services rendered by [said] those officers!, respective-~
\y-,} in any official capacity or employment during
their ! respective] terms of office.

|

|
J
j
|
|
i

j
i
I
J
j
I
'
j

Sec 14 ! Duties of Lieutenant Governor )
The Lieutenant Governor shall:

Sec. 15. (Duties of State Auditor and State Treasurer.]

Sec. 18. [Compensation of s t a t e and local officers.]

(3Xa) The Governor [oholl hove power to] may
grant respites or reprieves in all cases of convictions
for offenses against the state!,] except treason or
conviction on impeachment!; but such]. These respites or reprieves (shall] may not extend beyond
the next session of the board [of Pardons; and such
Boarol-J. At Isueh] that session, the board shall continue or determine (sueh] the respite or reprieve, (or
they may] commute the punishment, or pardon the
offense as 1 herein] provided in this section.

Section 7. It is p r o p o s e d t o a m e n d A r t i c l e
VII. Sec. 14, U t a h C o n s t i t u t i o n , to r e a d :

S e c t i o n 8. It is p r o p o s e d to a m e n d Article
VII, S e c . 15, Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n , t o read:

S e c t i o n 9. It is p r o p o s e d t o a m e n d A r t i c l e
VII, S e c . 18, Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n , t o r e a d :

(c) The proceedings and decisions of the board,
(with) the reasons therefor in each case, [together
with] and the dissent of any member who may disagree!;] shall be [reduced to writing,] recorded and
filed as provided by s t a t u t e with all papers used
upon the hearing!, in the office of such officer as provided by low],

<b) In case of conviction for treason, the Governor
jsholl hove the power to] may suspend execution of
the sentence!,] until the casetsholl bclis reported to
the Legislature at its next (regular) annual general
session, when the Legislature shall (either) pardon(;) or commute the sentence, or direct its executionlrfmo! the Governor ohall comfmmieateio-the
Legislature a t each regular session, e a e h e a s e e f r e mission of fine of forfeiture, reprieve. eomrmrtattoa.
or-pordon granted since the last -previous—refroft,
stovmg^the name of t h e convict, the crime for whieh
eoov+eteeVthe-9entenee and its date. 4he-dote of remts5K»n:ewnmuiotion.pe-Fo!ort.-orref>ryove. wtthtlie
^»M)mt for grant*ng thesomerend-the objectnm^. rf
any: of -a-ny member- of-4he-beard-made -thereto I If
the Legislature takes no action on the case before
adjournment of that session, the sentence shall be
Wcuted

f3) perform j s«eh} other duties as may be provided
by [lawj statute

i
j
j
j

1525

(b) 1 Nosueh] An officer 1 shall] may not receive for
the performance of any official duty any fee for personal use. but all fees fixed by (law J the Legislature
for the performance by [either] any of them of any
official duty!,] shall be collected in advance and deposited with the !State Treasurer monthly to the
eredtt of t h e State ] appropriate treasury.
<c; The Legislature may provide for t h e payment
of actual and necessary expenses of | said] those officers while traveling in the performance of official
duties
S e c t i o n 10. It is p r o p o s e d t o a m e n d Article
VIII, S e c . 12, U t a h C o n s t i t u t i o n , t o r e a d :
Sec 12 [Judicial Council — Chief justice as administrative officer — Legal counsel]
(A! i 11 There is created a Judicial Council (ts-establtshedj which shall adopt rules for the administration of the courts of the state.
«_2_» The Judicial Council shall consist of the chief
justice of the Supreme Court, as presiding officer,
and I sueh I other justices, judges, and other persons
as provided by statute There shall be at least one
representative on the Judicial Council from each
court established by the Constitution or by statute.
<_3 > The chief justice of the Supreme Court shall be
the chief administrative officer for the courts and

Art I, § 12

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Workmen s Compensation Act is not invalid
because it delegates to industrial commission
the power to hear, consider and determine controversies between litigants as to ultimate liability, or their property rights Utah Fuel Co
v Industrial Comm'n, 57 Utah 246, 194 P 122
(1920)
Dependents of employee killed by acts of
third party, a stranger to employment, are not

limited to recovery under Workmen s Compen
sation Act exclusively unless thev have as
signed their rights to insurance carrier Robin
son v Union Pac R R , 70 Utah 441, 261 P 9
(1927)
Cited in Wrolstad v Industrial Comm n, 786
P 2d 243 (Utah Ct App 1990)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — No-Fault Automobile
Insurance in Utah — State Constitutional Issues 1970 Utah L Rev 248
Comment, The Defense of Entrapment Next
Move — Due Process7 1971 Utah L Rev 266
Comment, The Scope of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Counsel in Prison Disciphn
ary Proceedings, 1971 Utah L Rev 275
Comment, The Utah Supreme Court and the
Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L Rev
319
Outdoor Sports and Torts An Analysis of
Utah's Recreational Use Act, 1988 Utah L
Rev 47
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1990
Utah L Rev 129
Am. Jur. 2d. — 16A Am Jur 2d Constitutional Law §§ 613 to 617
C.J.S. — 16D C J S Constitutional Law
§§ 1428 to 1437
A.L.R. — Exclusion of public from state

criminal trial in order to preserve confidential
lty of undercover witness, 54 A L R 4th 1156
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial
in order to prevent disturbance by spectators or
defendant, 55 A L R 4 t h 1170
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial
in order to avoid intimidation of witness 55
A L R 4 t h 1196
False light invasion of privacy—defenses
and remedies, 57 A L R 4th 244
Imputation of criminal, abnormal, or otherwise offensive sexual attitude or behavior as
defamation—post-New York Times cases, 57
A L R 4th 404
Libel or slander defamation by statement
made in jest, 57 A L R 4th 520
Defamation
designation as scab, 65
A L R 4 t h 1000
Intentional spoliation of evidence, interfering with prospective civil action, as actionable,
70 A L R 4th 984
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law
•» 322, 324, 327, 328

Sec, 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself, a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put m jeopardy for the same offense
History: Const. 1896.
Cross-References. — Rights of defendants,
statutory provisions, § 77 1-6
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CITIES, TOWNS AND SUBDIVISIONS

Ch. 48

10-3-919. Powers, duties and obligations of police chief, marshal and
their assistants in cities of the third class and towns.
The chief of police, marshals and their assistants in cities of the third
class and towns shall have all of the powers, rights and duties respectively
conferred on such officers in sections 10-3-913 through 10-3-915.
10-3-920. Bail commissioner—Powers and duties.
The mayor of any city of the third class or town, by and with the consent
of the council, and the board of commissioners in cities of the first and
second class, may appoint one or more discreet persons to be known as bail
commissioners, who shall have and exercise all the powers which are or may
be conferred by law upon justices of the peace or judges of the city court in
respect to fixing of bail of persons arrested within the corporate limits of the
municipality for misdemeanors under the laws of the state or for violation of
the municipal ordinance and to take, approve or declare forfeited any bail.
Any person who has been ordered by any bail commissioner to give bail may
deposit the amount thereof in money with the bail commissioner.
10-3-921. Fines—Collection by bail commissioner—Accounting.
Bail commissioners shall have the power to collect and give receipts for
monies tendered in payment of fines of any person serving a sentence in
default of the payment of a fine.
All monies collected by bail
commissioners shall be accounted for at least every seven days to the clerk
of the court where the court exists, and in municipalities where courts do not
exist the accounting shall be made to the municipal treasurer, or in cases
arising under state laws, to the county treasurer.
10-3-922. Term of bail commissioners—Salary—Bond and oath.
Commissioners appointed pursuant to section 10-3-920 shall serve at the
pleasure of the governing body and mayor appointing them. Before entering
upon their duties, bail commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath to
faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of their office and shall give a
bond to the municipality wherein they are appointed, with two good and
sufficient individual sureties or with a single corporate surety, to be
approved by the governing body and mayor appointing them which bond
shall be in the sum of at least for cities $2,500, and $1,000 for towns,
conditioned on the faithful performance of their duties as bail
commissioners, and that they account for and turn over to the clerk of the
court or to the treasurer of their respective municipality, as the case may be,
at the times provided by law, all monies, bonds, property and records coming
into their hands as bail commissioners, and that at the expiration of their
term of office they will surrender and turn over all funds, bonds, property
and records coming into their hands and pertaining to their office. Suit on
an> bond may be brought by any county, municipality or person injured.
10-3-923. City and
appointment.

town

justices

of

the

peace—Vacancy

and
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If a vacancy occurs in the office of a city or town justice, the mayor, by
and with the consent of the council, shall forthwith fill the vacancy by
appointment for the unexpired term. The person appointed shall qualify in
the same manner as a city or town justice, and shall have and exercise all
the powers conferred by law on city or town justices.
10-3-924. Disqualification.
\^"1A^
i *y
f /A
/ ,1
S
D

In case any city or town

Justice

sha11 for a n y reason

** unaDle

or

disqualified to perform the duties of his office, or shall be absent, the mayor
shall appoint another justice of the peace residing within the county to act
during the period of disability or absence, as city or town justice of the peace
pro tempore, and he shall have the powers and shall discharge the duties of
the city or town justice in the same manner and to the same extent as the
city or town justice might have done.
10-3-925. Compensation of justice.
A justice of the peace shall receive such compensation as the governing
body may by ordinance provide.
10-3-926. Payment of fees, fines or penalties to treasurer.
All fees, fines or penalties received by a municipal justice of the peace
shall be transferred to the municipal treasurer within seven days of receipt
by the justice of the peace.
10-3-927. Appointment of manager.
The governing body of any city or town may by ordinance establish a
manager form of government and appoint any person to be known as the
manager.
10-3-928. Term of office.
The manager shall serve at the pleasure of the governing body except
that the governing body may employ the manager for a term not to exceed
three years. The term of employment may be renewed at any time. Any
person serving as manager of a municipality under this section may be
removed with or without cause by a majority vote of the governing body.
10-3-929. Duties of the manager.
The governing body shall, by ordinance or resolution, prescribe the
powers, duties and obligations of the manager.
10-3-930. Legislative powers and official position of the mayor not
delegated.
The legislative and judicial powers of the mayor, his position as chairman
of the governing body and any ex-officio position the mayor shall hold shall
not be delegated to the manager.

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
cases shall be as preke Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Jes as may be adopted by the Su1980
[Effective until J a n u a r y 1,
p( this act:
faction" means the proceedings
on is charged, accused, and
jfor a public offense.
§e£$* means an accusation in writ*WOY a grand jury to the district
' a person with a public offense.
|tipn" means an accusation, in
tig a person with a public offense
ented and signed by a prosecuting
F filed in the office of the clerk where
IjSn is commenced or subscribed and
^complaining witness before a magr /offense is a class B misdemeanor or
Unse not requiring approval of the
^attorney.
_£trate" means a justice of the SuTr$ a judge of the district courts, a
Pjuvenile courts, a judge of the circuit
udge of the justice courts, or a judge of
^atedbylaw.
1990
•^ttefinitions [Effective

ft

J a n u a r y 1,

of this act:
iminal action" means the proceedings
a person is charged, accused, and
trial for a public offense.
fdictment" means an accusation in writented by a grand jury to the district
ftg a person with a public offense.
formation" means an accusation, in
^charging a person with a public offense
^presented and signed by a prosecuting
H y and filed in the office of the clerk where
^osScution is commenced or subscribed and
x J
S by a complaining witness before a mag_ithe offense is a class B misdemeanor or
er offense not requiring approval of the
piting attorney.
"Magistrate" means a justice or judge of a
i of record or not of record or a commissioner
| | c n a court appointed in accordance with Sec"^8-3-31.
1991
^Conviction to p r e c e d e p u n i s h m e n t
>erson shall be punished for a public offense
d i e t e d in a court having jurisdiction.
1980
Prosecuting party.
iminal action for any violation of a state statpHall be prosecuted in the name of the state of
IPC Criminal action for violation of any county or
3Spal ordinance shall be prosecuted in the name
overnmental entity involved.
2980
p C $ l , Rights of d e f e n d a n t
ffi^fc criminal prosecutions the defendant is enti^ 0 ( a ) To appear in person and defend m person
&- jpr by counsel;
^ ^ (b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed
^ a g a i n s t him;
>!£*: (c) To testify in his own behalf;
§£&>. (d) To be confronted by the witnesses against
S> him;

77-la-l

(e) To have compulsory process to insure the
attendance of witnesses in his behalf;
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial
jury of the county or district where the offense is
alleged to have been committed;
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with
provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial within
30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail
and if the business of the court permits.
(2) In addition:
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for
the same offense;
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to
secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those
rights when received;
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself;
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband nor a husband against his
wife; and
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction,
upon a judgment by a magistrate.
1980
77-1-7.

Dismissal without trial — Custody or
d i s c h a r g e of d e f e n d a n t
(1) (a) Further prosecution for an offense is not
barred if the court dismisses an information or
indictment based on the ground:
(i) there was unreasonable delay;
(ii) the court is without jurisdiction;
(iii) the offense was not properly alleged
in the information or indictment; or
(iv) there was a defect in the impaneling
or the proceedings relating to the grand jury,
(b) The court may make orders regarding custody of the defendant pending the filing of new
charges as the interest of justice may require.
Otherwise, the defendant shall be discharged and
bail exonerated.
(2) An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the defendant to trial or upon
the statute of limitations is a bar to any other prosecution for the offense charged.
1990
CHAPTER l a
P E A C E OFFICER DESIGNATION
Section
77-la-l.
77-la-2.
77-la-3.
77-la-4.
77-la-5.
77-la-6.

77-la-7.
77-la-8.
77-la-9.

Peace officer.
Correctional officer.
Reserve and auxiliary officers.
Special function officers.
Federal peace officers — Authority.
Basic training requirements for position
— Peace officers temporarily in the
state.
Responsibility for training — Certification.
Retirement.
References in other provisions.

77-la-l. P e a c e officer.
(1) "Peace officer" means any employee of a police
or law enforcement agency which is part of or administered by the state or any of its political subdivisions,
and whose duties consist primarily of the prevention
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state being divided into circuits as provided in this
chapter.
1977
78-4-5.

Jurisdiction — E x c l u s i v e and concurrent [Effective until J a n u a r y 1, 1992].
(1) (a) Circuit courts have jurisdiction over all
classes of misdemeanors and infractions involving persons 18 years of age and older and may
impose the punishments prescribed for these offenses. The judge of the circuit court has the authority and jurisdiction of a magistrate including
the conducting of proceedings for the preliminary
examination to determine probable cause, commitment prior to trial, or the release on bail of
persons charged with criminal offenses.
(b) When a complaint may be commenced before a magistrate under Section 77-3-1 or an arrested person is to be taken before a magistrate
under Section 77-7-18, the complaint may be
commenced or the arrested person may be taken
before any circuit court judge in the county or the
justice court judge in the county in whose precinct the offense occurred, unless both are unavailable; then before any justice court judge
having jurisdiction.
(c) All complaints fpr offenses charged under
Title 41 except offenses charged under Article 5,
Chapter 6, Title 41, shall be filed in the municipal justice court or the county justice court where
the offense occurred if those justice courts exist
and have jurisdiction of the offenses.
(2) The circuit court has exclusive original jurisdiction of all cases arising under or by reason of the
violation of any county ordinance involving persons
18 years of age or older, but if a county justice court
exists in the county, jurisdiction is concurrent.
(3) (a) The circuit court has exclusive original jurisdiction of all cases arising under or by reason
of the violation of any municipal ordinance involving persons 18 years of age and older in those
municipalities in which a municipal department
of the circuit court exists or has been created.
(b) The circuit court has concurrent jurisdiction ^with county justice courts over violations of
municipal ordinances charging persons 18 years
of age and older with driving under the influence
of alcohol or drugs, driving with a blood alcohol
content of .08% or higher, or reckless driving in
municipalities within a county precinct in which
a municipal justice court does not exist.
(c) The circuit court has concurrent jurisdiction with municipal justice courts over violations
of state statutes in municipalities where a municipal justice court exists.
(4) The circuit court has jurisdiction over traffic
offenses committed by persons older than 16 and
younger than 18 years of age except those offenses
exclusive to the juvenile court under Subsection
(lXc), Subsection 78-3a-16(l)(a), and Section
78-5-105. The circuit court shall notify the juvenile
court of a conviction of any person younger than 18
years of age of an offense under Section 78-3a-39.5.
(5) The circuit court has authority to take the juvenile's driver license and return it to the Driver License Division, Department of Public Safety, for suspension under Section 41-2rl28.
(6) Circuit court judges may transfer cases within
the court's jurisdiction under Subsection (4) to the
juvenile court for postjudgment proceedings according to rules of the Judicial Council.
1990

Circuit court jurisdiction
,
diction in circuit court w h e n n o jij
court — Jurisdiction retained unti
fective date [Effective J a n u a r y l£i§
Circuit courts have jurisdiction over class A C
meanors. Circuit courts have jurisdiction over <
misdemeanors classified by Article 5, Chapter!
41, Driving While Intoxicated and Reckless ]
ordinances that comply with the requirement
tion 41-6-43, and class B misdemeanors classiiif
any title other than Title 41. Circuit courts 3
risdiction over all related misdemeanors arisil
of a single criminal episode. When a justice i
given jurisdiction of a criminal matter and theti
justice court with territorial jurisdiction, the?
court shall have jurisdiction. The circuit coti
retain jurisdiction over cases properly filed ufl
cuit court prior to January 1, 1992. The circui?
shall have jurisdiction as provided
10-3-923.
78-4-6. Municipal department of circuit <
Report t o court administrate;!
pealed effective J a n u a r y 1, 19
(1) (a) The governing body of any mu
may by ordinance establish a municipal^
ment of the circuit court. A circuit court5?
capacity is the Municipal department^
(naming the circuit) circuit court for (11
municipality), Utah." ,
(b) A circuit court established under Jj
tion (lXa), for which funding is not ava
time of establishment, may not be imple
until funding is provided for the courO
(c) If the governing body of a municipa
tablishes a municipal department of thejj
court, a municipal justice court judge mav,
appointed or elected. The circuit judges i
cessors of the justice court judges actio
municipality where municipal dep
the circuit court are established.
(2) (a) Governing bodies of municipalitie
lishing municipal departments of the
court may vacate the establishment of t h l
court by ordinance and return to a municj|
tice court.
(b) If a governing body establishes
court or returns to a justice court systemfj
cause the Office of the State Court Ad
to be notified in writing within 30 daysd
fact.
Up
78-4-7. Civil jurisdiction — Exception
tive until J a n u a r y 1, 1992]; '
The circuit court has civil jurisdiction^!
and equity, in all matters if the sum claimej
than $10,000, exclusive of court costs, exp
(1) in actions to determine the titf
property, but not excluding actions
mechanics' liens;
(2) in actions of divorce, child custody|
ternity;
(3) in actions under the Utah Uniform
Code;
(4) in actions to review the decisidij
state administrative agency, board, cou
mission, or hearing officer;
(5) in actions seeking remedies in t n |
extraordinary writs; and
(6) in all other actions where, by stati
diction is exclusively vested in the distfl
or other trial or appellate court.
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PART 2

BURGLARY A N D CRIMINAL TRESPASS
76-6-201. Definitions.
For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning,
means any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or
other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business therein
and includes:
(a) each separately secured or occupied portion of
the structure or vehicle; and
(b) each structure appurtenant to or connected
with the structure or vehicle.
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night, whether or not
a person is actually present.
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon
premises when the premises or any portion thereof at the
time of the entry or remaining are not open to the public
and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged
to enter or remain on the premises or such portion
thereof.
(4) "Enter" means:
(a) intrusion of any part of the body; or
(b) intrusion of any physical object under control of
the actor.
1973
76-6-202. Burglary.
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with
intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any
person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was
committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the
second degree.
1973
76-6-203. A g g r a v a t e d burglary.
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing, or fleeing from a burglary the actor or
another participant in the crime:
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a
participant in the crime;
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous
weapon against any person who is not a participant in the
crime; or
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous weapon.
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony.
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the
same definition as under Section 76-1-601.
1989
76-6-204.

B u r g l a r y of a v e h i c l e — C h a r g e of o t h e r
offense.
(1) Any person who unlawfully enters any vehicle with
intent to commit a felony or theft is guilty of a burglary of a
vehicle.
(2) Burglary of a vehicle is a class A misdemeanor.
(3) A charge against any person for a violation of Subsection
(1) shall not preclude a charge for a commission of any other
offense.
1973
76-6-205.

M a n u f a c t u r e or p o s s e s s i o n of i n s t r u m e n t for
b u r g l a r y or theft.
Any person who manufactures or possesses any instrument,
tool, device, article, or other thing adapted, designed, or
commonly used in advancing or facilitating the commission of
any offense under circumstances manifesting an intent to use
or knowledge that some person intends to use the same in the
commission of a burglary or theft is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
1973

76-6-401

76-6-206. Criminal t r e s p a s s .
(1) For purposes of this section "enter" means intrusion of
the entire body.
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances not amounting to burglary as defined in Section
76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 7-6-204:
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and:
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any
person or damage to any property, including the use
of graffiti as defined in Section 76-6-107;
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft
or a felony; or
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will
cause fear for the safety of another, or
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he
enters or remains on property as to which notice against
entering is given by:
(i) personal communication to the actor by the
owner or someone with apparent authority to act for
the owner;
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed
to exclude intruders;
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to
the attention of intruders.
(3) (a) A violation of Subsection (2Xa) is a class C misdemeanor unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which
event it is a class B misdemeanor.
(b) A violation of Subsection (2)(b) is an infraction.
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the:
(a) property was open to the public when the actor
entered or remained; and
(b) actor's conduct did not substantially interfere with
the owner's use of the property.
1996
PARTS
ROBBERY
76-6-301. Robbery.
(1) A person commits robbery if:
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or
attempts to take personal property in the possession of
another from his person, or immediate presence, against
his will, by means of force or fear; or
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or
fear of immediate force against another in the course of
committing a theft.
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing
a theft" if it occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission
of theft, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or
commission.
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.
1995
76-6-302. A g g r a v a t e d robbery.
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of
committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as
defined in Section 76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered
to be "in the course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an
attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the
immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery.
1994

PART 4
THEFT
76-6-401. Definitions.
For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real
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JUDICIAL CODE

(5) The Judicial Council shall include in its annual report a list of all
justice court judges in the state showing those that are certified under this
section and those not.
History: C. 1953, 78-5-127, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 157, & 36.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 157,
§ 51 makes the act effective on July 1, 1989.
1989.
Cross-References. — Annual training sem-

inar, Rule 9-103. Rules of Judicial Administration
Judicial Council, Utah Const., Art VIII, Sec.
1 *?• & 7ft 1 01

judicial Conduct Commission, Utah Const.,
Art. VIII, Sec. 13; § 78-3-27.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Justices of
the Peace §§ 6, 8.

C.J.S. — 51 C.J.S. Justices of the Peace § 7.
Key Numbers. — Justices of the Peace «=» 5.

78-5-128. Determination of compensation and limits — Salary survey — Limits on secondary employment.
(1) (a) Every justice court judge shall be paid a fixed compensation determined by the governing body of the respective municipality or county
taking into consideration recommendations of the office of the state court
administrator as provided in Subsection (2), but in no case may the salary
for a justice court judge be an amount greater than 75% of the salary of a
circuit court judge.
(b) The compensation shall be comprised of a monthly salary and shall
be computed upon the number of hours, days, or other periods of time that
the justice court judge is to be available to perform all judicial functions.
(2) (a) The state court administrator with the approval of the Judicial
Council shall survey areas of the state relating to the functions and activities of the justice courts, taking into consideration the diverse economic
factors of the various localities of the justice courts, and develop recommended monthly salaries. These recommendations shall be furnished to
the governing bodies of the municipalities and the counties to assist them
in determining salaries.
(b) The state court administrator may make studies concerned with the
economic as well as administrative feasibility to encourage the various
political subdivisions to utilize the same person or persons to act as justice
court judges for their several jurisdictions and to assist political subdivisions desiring to enter into agreements for that purpose.
(3) A justice court judge may not appear as an attorney in any criminal
matter in a federal, state, or justice court or appear as an attorney in any
justice court or in any juvenile court case involving conduct which would be
criminal if committed bv an adult.
(4) A justice court judge may not hold any office or employment including
contracting for services in any justice agency of state government or any
political subdivision of the state including law enforcement, prosecution,
criminal defense, corrections, or court employment.
(5) A justice court judge may not hold any office in any politicaTpafty "Of"
organization engaged in any political activity or serve as an elected official in
state government or any political subdivision of the state.
146
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GENERAL PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO COURTS AND JUDGES 78-7-17.5

(2) The court may appoint an attorney guardian ad litem, when it considers
it necessary and appropriate, to represent the best interest of the child in all
related proceedings conducted in any state court involving the alleged abuse,
child sexual abuse, or neglect.
(3) The attorney guardian ad litem shall be appointed in accordance with
and meet the requirements of Sections 78-3a-911 and 78-3a-912.
(4) If an attorney guardian ad litem has been appointed for the child by any
court in the state in any prior proceeding or related matter, the court may
continue that appointment or may reappoint that attorney guardian ad litem,
if still available, to act on behalf of the child.
(5) The court is responsible for all costs resulting from the appointment of
an attorney guardian ad litem and shall use funds appropriated by the
Legislature for the guardian ad litem program to cover those costs.
(6) If the court appoints a guardian ad litem attorney pursuant to this
section or Section 78-3a-912, the court may assess all or part of those attorney s
fees, court costs, paralegal, staff, and volunteer expenses against the minor's
parent or parents in an amount that the court determines to be just and
appropriate. The court may not assess those fees or costs against a parent who
is found to be impecunious.
(7) An attorney guardian ad litem appointed in accordance with the requirements of this section and Sections 78,-3a-911 and 78-3a-912 is, when serving in
the scope of duties of an attorney guardian ad litem, considered an employee
of this state for purposes of indemnification under the Governmental Immunity Act.
History: C. 1953, 78-7-9, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 213, § 5; 1993, ch. 175, § 3; 1994,
ch. 157, $ 4; 1995, ch. 68, § 2; 1996, ch. 1,
§ 89; 1997, ch. 194, § 4.

Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1,1997, rewrote Subsection
(6).

78-7-17.5, Authority of magistrate.
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, a magistrate as defined in Section
77-1-3 shall have the authority to:
(a) commit a person to incarceration prior to trial;
(b) set or deny bail under Section 77-20-1 and release upon the payment
of bail and satisfaction of any other conditions of release;
(c) issue to any place in the state summonses and warrants of search
and arrest and authorize administrative traffic checkpoints under Section
77-23-104;
(d) conduct an initial appearance in a felony;
(e) conduct arraignments;
(f) conduct a preliminary examination to determine probable cause;
(g) appoint attorneys and order recoupment of attorney fees;
(h) order the preparation of presentence investigations and reports;
(i) issue temporary orders as provided by rule of the Judicial Council;
and
(j) perform any other act or function authorized by statute.
(2) A judge of the justice court may exercise the authority of a magistrate
specified in Subsection (1) with the following limitations:
(a) a judge of the justice court may conduct an initial appearance,
preliminary examination, or arraignment in a felony case as provided by
rule of the Judicial Council; and
(b) a judge of the justice court may not set bail in a capital or first degree
felony nor deny bail in any case; and
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History: C. 1953, 78-5-112, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 157, f 21.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 157,
§ 51 makes the act effective on July 1,1989.

DE

Croaa-Referaices, — Selection of j ^
Role 18, Rules of Criminal Procedure.
'

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AXJL — Jury trial rights in, and on appeal
from, small claims court proceeding, 70
AXJUth 1119.

78-5-113. Process to any part of the state — Service,
(1) Process from a justice court may be issued to any place in the.state,
(2) Subpoenas in any action or proceeding of a justice court may be issued to
any place in the state.
(3) All warrants issued by a justice court for violation of any state law or
local ordinance within a court's jurisdiction are directed to the sheriff, any
constable of the county, or to the marshal or city police of the town or city.
History: C. 1953, 78-5-113, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 157, S 22.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 157,
§ 51 makes the act effective on July 1, 1989.
Cross-References. — Process, Rule 4, Rules
of Civil Procedure.

Abuse of process a misdemeanor, § 76-S-60L
Constables to serve process, § 17-25-1.
Peace officers may serve process, i 10-748.
Sheriffs to serve process, § 17-22-2.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Justices of
the Peace § 58.
CJLS. — 51 CJJS. Justices of the Peace
§ 67.

Key Numbers. — Justices of the Peace *•
79.

78-5-114, 78-5-115. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1991, ch. 268, § 49 repeals rent criminal jurisdiction and jurisdiction of
§§ 78-5-114 and 78-5-115. as enacted by Laws municipal and county courts, respectively, ef1989, ch. 157, §§ 23 and 24, relating to concur- fective January 1, 1992.

78-5-116. Disposition of fines.
(1) Except as otherwise specified by this section, fines and forfeitures collected by a justice court shall be remitted, one-half to the treasurer of the local
government responsible for the court and one-half to the treasurer of the local
government which prosecutes or which would prosecute the violation.
(2) (a) For vioi*i.^n of Title 23, the court shall allocate 85% to the Division
of Wildlife Resources and 15% to the general fund of the city or county
government responsible for the justice court.
(b) For violation of Title 73, Chapter 18, the court shall allocate 85% to
the Division of Parks and Recreation and 15% to the general fund of the
city or county government responsible for the justice court
(3) The surcharge established by Section 63-63a-l shall be paid to the state
treasurer.
138

Ch. 48
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CITIES, TOWNS AND SUBDIVISIONS

[268]
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) 10-3-1205. Rights, powers, and duties of municipality operating under
option form.
Any municipality operating under this part shall retain and have the
rights, powers, and duties now or hereafter granted to municipalities of the
same class and those rights, powers and duties which could be granted to
municipalities of the same class.
K

^

10-3-1206. Limitation on changing form of government.
Following approval of an ^optional form of municipal government by
voters of a municipality, no other form of municipal government may be
placed on the ballot in the municipality for a period of six years after the
election at which the optional form was approved.
10-3-1207. Disapproval of optional form by voters—Limitation on
resubmission.
If the voters of a municipality fail to approve an optional form of
municipal government at a special election called for the purpose, the same
optional form may not be placed on the ballot of that municipality for a
period of at least two years following the date on which it was disapproved.
10-3-1208. Election of officers—When new government operative—
Compensation of officials without position in new government.
Upon approval of an optional form of government by a municipality
pursuant to this part, election of officers shall be held in the municipality on
the Tuesday next following the first Monday in November following
approval of the optional form, or on the same day in the year next following,
whichever day falls in an odd-numbered year. The new government shall
become effective at 12 o'clock noon on the first Monday of January following
the election of officers. Elected officials of the municipality whose positions
would no longer exist as a result of the adoption of a form of government
provided for in this act shall be paid at the same rate until the date on which
their terms would have expired, if they hold no municipal office in the new
government for which they are regularly compensated. At their option,
former commissioners of first and second class cities, council members of
third class cities, or board members of towns may serve as one of the council
members for the remainder of their term.
10-3-1209. Council-mayor and council-manager form defined.
The optional form of government known as the council-mayor form vests
the government of a municipality which adopts this form in two separate,
independent, and equal branches of municipal government; the executive
branch consisting of a mayor and the administrative departments and
officers; and the legislative branch consisting of a municipal council. The
optional form known as the council-manager form vests the government of
the municipality in a municipal council which shall be deemed the governing
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Rule 7

the prosecuting attorney, any unexecuted warrant shall be returned to
the magistrate for cancellation.
(Amended by L. 1993, ch. 17, § 4, effective July 1, 1993.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendment, effective July 1, 1993, rewrote the last
sentence in Subdivision (b), adding Subdivisions (1) and (2) and substituting 'the magistrate shall state on the warrant:" for "the
amount of bail shall be fixed by the magistrate
and stated on the warrant."
Cross-References. — Arrest generally,
§ 77-7-1 et seq.
Bail, § 77-20-1 et seq.
Bench warrant, failure of one on bail to appear at arraignment, Rule 10.

Bench warrant, failure of one on bail to appear for judgment, Rule 22.
Citation for misdemeanor, §§ 77-7-18 to
77-7-20.
Extradition, governor's warrant, § 77-30-7.
Fees of constable serving warrant or summons, § 21-3-3.5.
"Magistrate" defined, § 77-1-3.
Rules of Evidence inapplicable to proceedings for issuance of warrant for arrest or for
issuance of criminal summons, U.R.E. 1101.
Youth Parole Authority, revocation of parole, order to retake violator, § 62A-7-112.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Affidavits.
Issuance of warrant.
—Discretion of magistrate.
Affidavits.
Affidavits for arrest need not show a prima
facie case; affidavits need only set forth facts
tending to establish the commission of the offense and the guilt of the defendant. United
States v. Eldredge, 5 Utah 161, 13 P. 673
(1887), appeal dismissed, 145 U.S. 636, 12 S.
Ct. 980, 36 L. Ed. 857 (1892).

Issuance of warrant.
—Discretion of magistrate.
A magistrate is not justified in refusing to
issue a warrant unless the charge is too indefinitely stated to warrant the belief that an offense has been committed, or that defendant is
the guilty party. United States v. Eldredge, 5
Utah 161, 13 P. 673 (1887), appeal dismissed,
145 U.S. 636, 12 S. Ct. 980, 36 L. Ed. 857
(1892).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest § 10 et
seq.; 8 Am. Jur. 2d Bail and Recognizance
§ 23.
C.J.S. — 6A C.J.S. Arrest §§ 4 to 9; 8 C.J.S.

Bail §§ 23, 54; 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 334
et seq.
Key Numbers. — Arrest *» 65 to 68; Bail «=»
42, 49; Criminal Law •» 215 to 220.

Rule 7. Proceedings before magistrate.
(a) When a summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest, the defendant
shall appear before the court as directed in the summons.
(b) When any peace officer or other person makes an arrest with or without
a warrant, the person arrested shall be taken to the nearest available magistrate for setting of bail. If an information has not been filed, one shall be filed
without delay before the magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense.
(c) (1) If a person is arrested in a county other than where the offense was
committed the person arrested shall without unnecessary delay be returned to the county where the crime was committed and shall be taken
before the proper magistrate under these rules.
(2) If for any reason the person arrested cannot be promptly returned to
the county and the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor for
which a voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a conviction under
Subsection 77-7-21(1), the person arrested may state in writing a desire to
forfeit bail, waive trial in the district in which the information is pending,
and consent to disposition of the case in the county in which the person
was arrested, is held, or is present.
(3) Upon receipt of the defendant's statement, the clerk of the court in
which the information is pending shall transmit the papers in the proceeding or copies of them to the clerk of the court for the county in which
the defendant is arrested, held, or present. The prosecution shall continue
in that county.
(4) Forfeited bail shall be returned to the jurisdiction that issued the
warrant.
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(5) If the defendant is charged with an offense other than a misdemeanor for which a voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a
conviction under Subsection 77-7-21(1), the defendant shall be taken
without unnecessary delay before a magistrate within the county of arrest for the determination of bail under Section 77-20-1 and released on
bail or held without bail under Section 77-20-1.
(6) Bail shall be returned to the magistrate having jurisdiction over the
offense, with the record made of the proceedings before the magistrate.
(d) The magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense charged shall, upon
the defendant's first appearance, inform the defendant:
(1) of the charge in the information or indictment and furnish a copy;
(2) of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of the information and how to obtain them;
(3) of the right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the court
without expense if unable to obtain counsel;
(4) of rights concerning pretrial release, including bail; and
(5) that the defendant is not required to make any statement, and that
the statements the defendant does make may be used against the defendant in a court of law.
(e) The magistrate shall, after providing the information under paragraph
(d) and before proceeding further, allow the defendant reasonable time and
opportunity to consult counsel and shall allow the defendant to contact any
attorney by any reasonable means, without delay and without fee.
(f) If the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor, the magistrate
shall call upon the defendant to enter a plea.
(1) If the plea is guilty, the defendant shall be sentenced by the magistrate as provided by law.
(2) If the plea is not guilty, a trial date shall be set. The date may not
be extended except for good cause shown. Trial shall be held under these
rules and law applicable to criminal cases.
(g) (1) If a defendant is charged with a felony, the defendant may not be
called on to enter a plea before the committing magistrate. During the
initial appearance before the magistrate, the defendant shall be advised
of the right to a preliminary examination. If the defendant waives the
right to a preliminary examination, and the prosecuting attorney consents, the magistrate shall order the defendant bound over to answer in
the district court.
(2) If the defendant does not waive a preliminary examination, the
magistrate shall schedule the preliminary examination. The examination
shall be held within a reasonable time, but not later than ten days if the
defendant is in custody for the offense charged and not later than 30 days
if the defendant is not in custody. These time periods may be extended by
the magistrate for good cause shown. A preliminary examination may not
be held if the defendant is indicted.
(h) (1) A preliminary examination shall be held under the rules and laws
applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The state has the burden
of proof and shall proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of the
state's case, the defendant may testify under oath, call witnesses, and
present evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine adverse witnesses.
(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe
that the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has
committed it, the magistrate shall order, in writing, that the defendant be
bound over to answer in the district court. The findings of probable cause
may be based on hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to evidence on
the ground that it was acquired by unlawful means are not properly
raised at the preliminary examination.

361

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 7

(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the
crime charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it,
the magistrate shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
an order of dismissal. The dismissal and discharge do not preclude the
state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense,
(i) At a preliminary examination, the magistrate, upon request of either
party, may exclude witnesses from the courtroom and may require witnesses
not to converse with each other until the preliminary examination is concluded. On the request of either party, the magistrate may order all spectators
to be excluded from the courtroom.
(j) (1) If the magistrate orders the defendant bound over to the district
court, the magistrate shall execute in writing a bind-over order and shall
transmit to the clerk of the district court all pleadings in and records
made of the proceedings before the magistrate, including exhibits, recordings, and any typewritten transcript.
(2) When a magistrate commits a defendant to the custody of the sheriff, the magistrate shall execute the appropriate commitment order,
(k) (1) When a magistrate has good cause to believe that any material
witness in a pending case will not appear and testify unless bond is required, the magistrate may fix a bond with or without sureties and in a
sum considered adequate for the appearance of the witness.
(2) If the witness fails or refuses to post the bond with the clerk of the
court, the magistrate may commit the witness to jail until the witness
complies or is otherwise legally discharged.
(3) If the witness does provide bond when required, the witness may be
examined and cross-examined before the magistrate in the presence of the
defendant and the testimony shall be recorded. The witness shall then be
discharged.
(4) If the witness is unavailable or fails to appear at any subsequent
hearing or trial when ordered to do so, the recorded testimony may be
used at the hearing or trial in lieu of the personal testimony of the witness.
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; November 1, 1996.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendment, effective May 1, 1993, revised the subdivision designations, substituting letters for
numbers and vice versa and changing an internal reference accordingly, and deleted "under
Section 77-7-19" from the end of the first sentence in Subdivision (b).
The 1996 amendment substituted "the nearest available magistrate" for "a magistrate. If a
magistrate is not available in the circuit or
precinct, the person arrested shall be taken to
the nearest available magistrate" in Subdivision (b), inserted "is" twice near the end of Subdivision (c)(2), and made stylistic changes to
make the text gender-neutral throughout.
Cross-References. — Court reporters,
§ 78-56-1.1 et seq.

Exclusion of witnesses and others, § 78-7-4.
Juvenile committing felony, hearing and certification to district court, § 78-3a-25.
Juvenile court, transfer of criminal proceeding to, § 78-3a-18.
Police lineup, right to have attorney present,
§ 77-8-2.
Preliminary examination may be waived,
Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 13.
Rights of accused persons, Utah Const., Art.
I, Sees. 7 to 12; § 77-1-6.
Rules of Evidence inapplicable to proceedings for bail, Rule 1101, U.R.E.
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §5 76-3-201,
76-3-204, 76-3-301.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Appeals.
Duties of magistrate.
Preliminary hearing.
—Binding accused over.
Different offense.
Failure to sign order.
—Concurrent jurisdiction of circuit and district
courts.

—Evidence.
—Nature of right.
—Necessity.
—Public access.
—Right to counsel.
Waiver.
—Standard of proof.
—Time.
Delay for good cause.
—Transcript.
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(v) presiding over meetings of the tax judges; and
(vi) the use of law clerk resources to develop tax expertise, to assist the
tax judges, and to facilitate consistency in the development of case precedents in the tax area and otherwise assist in the transition as new tax
judges are designated.
(6) If a tax judge decides a taxation case of first impression, or one which
creates new law or gives new guidance, the tax judge shall cause an opinion of
the case to be published. An opinion need not be published where the case
deals with settled rules of law.
(7) Tax judges shall serve only so long as they are district court judges. Tax
judges may, however, resign as tax judges, at their own request or the request
of the Judicial Council, while still serving as district court judges.
(8) If a tax judge does not have a full workload of taxation cases, the judge
shall hear non-tax district court cases to maintain a full workload of cases.
(Added effective April 1, 1997.)
Cross-References. — Citation of opinion in
case involving taxation published under this

rule, Rule 4-508, Rules of Judicial Administration.

ARTICLE 2.
CIVIL.
Rule 6-201. Distribution of trust funds.
Intent:
To establish a procedure for the distribution of funds deposited in a court
trust account.
Applicability:
This rule applies to the District Courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) When an order of distribution is presented to the District Court for
payment of funds deposited with the court in an interest bearing account, as
ordered by the court, the order shall include the social security number of the
recipient if an individual or the federal tax identification number if a business
entity.
(2) Interest earned will be distributed based upon a percentage of the principal amount allocated to each recipient named in the order.

ARTICLE 3.
CRIMINAL.
Rule 6-301. Authority of court commissioner as magistrate.
Intent:
To provide for the authority of a court commissioner to act as a magistrate
as required by § 77-1-3.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to court commissioners.
Statement of the Rule:
A court commissioner may exercise the following authority conferred upon
magistrates by the Legislature:
(1) issue warrants and summonses in traffic cases; and
(2) set bail in traffic cases.
(Added effective November 15, 1995.)
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BOARD O F P A R D O N S
AND PAROLE AMENDMENTS
By Delpha A. Baird
tf ACT RELATING T O THE CRIMINAL
CODE; CORRECTING THE NAME T O T H E
BOARD OF PARDONS A N D PAROLE; AND
MAKING OTHER TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.
'HIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS:
iMENDS:
,3-5-210, AS RENUMBERED AND AMENDED
BY CHAPTER 234, LAWS OF UTAH
1993
.3A-1-403.5, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 90.
LAWS OF UTAH 1992
12A-12-204.5, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 245,
LAWS OF UTAH 1989
13-2-103, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER
280, LAWS OF UTAH 1992
13-2-304, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTERS
228 AND 280, LAWS OF UTAH 1992
13-25-2, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 238,
LAWS OF UTAH 1992
tf-55-277, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 137,
LAWS OF UTAH 1990
53-89-1, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 77, LAWS
OF UTAH 1993
>3-89-4, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 77, LAWS
OF UTAH 1993
>4-13-6, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 103,
LAWS OF UTAH 1993
>4-13-14.7, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 11.
LAWS OF UTAH 1991
>4-13-17, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER
103, LAWS OF UTAH 1993
>4-13-18. AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 211,
LAWS OF UTAH 1985
>4-13-20. AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER
206, LAWS OF UTAH 1991
*-13-21, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTERS
103 AND 220, LAWS OF UTAH 1993
^ 13-29, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER
116, LAWS OF UTAH 1987
*-13a-6. AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER
,
224, LAWS OF UTAH 1989
)
~ 2 2 ~2, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTERS 65
AND 234. LAWS OF UTAH 1993
"-'H201. AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 17.
LAWS OF UTAH 1993
^ 2 0 2 . AS AST AMENDED BY CHAPTER
^
125. LAWS OF UTAH 1989
40
1 - AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER
?7-•16-5 181. LAWS OF UTAH 1989
AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 15. LAWS
rv , r
W U T A H 19S0
AS ENACTED BY CHAFTER 171.
r?>18-1 l-AWSOK UTAH 1992
AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTERS S2

Be it enacted by the Legislature

of the state of Utah:

S e c t i o n 1. S e c t i o n A m e n d e d .
Section 5 3 - 5 - 2 1 0 . Utah Code Annotated 1953. as
renumbered and amended by Chapter 234. Laws of
Utah 1993. is amended to read:
!
J

5 3 - 5 - 2 1 0 . P e n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d state
hospital to supply information.
i 1) The warden of the state prison, keeper of any
jail or correctional institution, and superintendent
of the state hospital shall forward to the division
ia) the fingerprints and recent photographs of all
persons confined in each institution under criminal
commitment:
tb i information relating to the parole, termination
or expiration of sentence, or any other release oi
each person from confinement during the preceding
month: and
•(•' a photograph taken near the time of release.
••'2] The adult probation and parole section of th<
Department of Corrections shall furnish to the diviMOII:
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History: C. 1953, 77-27-4, enacted by L.
)85, ch. 198, § 8; 1989, ch. 112, § 1; 1990,
I. 195, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendent, effective April 23,1990, rewrote Subsecon (1), which read "One member of the board
tall be designated by the governor as chairan for a term the governor specifies"; deleted

77-27-5

former Subsection (2), which read "Any two
members constitute a quorum"; redesignated
former Subsection (3) as Subsection (2) and
substituted "chairperson" for "board of pardons" and for "chairman" in two places therein;
an<^ deleted former Subsection (4) relating to
appointment of a chief executive officer,

7-27-5- Board of Pardons authority.
(1) (a) The Board of Pardons shall determine by majority decision when and
under what conditions, subject to this chapter and other laws of the state,
persons committed to serve sentences in class A misdemeanor cases at
penal or correctional facilities which are under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Corrections, and all felony cases except treason or impeachment or as otherwise limited by law, may be released upon parole,
pardoned, restitution ordered, or have their fines, forfeitures, or restitution remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated.
(b) The board may sit together or in panels to conduct hearings. The
chairperson shall appoint members to the panels in any combination and
in accordance with rules promulgated by the board, except in hearings
involving commutation and pardons. The chairperson may participate on
any panel and when doing so is chairperson of the panel. The chairperson
of the board may designate the chairperson for any other panel.
(c) No restitution may be ordered, no fine, forfeiture, or restitution
remitted, no parole, pardon, or commutation granted or sentence terminated, except after a full hearing before the board or the board's appointed examiner in open session. Any action taken under this subsection
other than by a majority of the board shall be affirmed by a majority of
the board.
(d) A commutation or pardon may be granted only after a full hearing
before the board.
(2) (a) In the case of original parole grant hearings, rehearings, and parole
revocation hearings, timely prior notice of the time and place of the hearing shall be given to the defendant, the county attorney's office responsible for prosecution of the case, the sentencing court, law enforcement
officials responsible for the defendant's arrest and conviction, and whenever possible, the victim or the victim's family.
(b) Notice to the victim, his representative, or his family shall include
information provided in Section 77-27-9.5, and any related rules made by
the board under that section. This information shall be provided in terms
that are reasonable for the lay person to understand.
(3) Decisions of the Board of Pardons in cases involving paroles, pardons,
ommutations or terminations of sentence, restitution, or remission of fines or
)rfeitures are final and are not subject to judicial review. Nothing in this
ection prevents the obtaining or enforcement of a civil judgment.
(4) This chapter may not be construed as a denial of or limitation of the
overnor's power to grant respite or reprieves in all cases of convictions for
flenses against the state, except treason or conviction on impeachment. Howver, respites or reprieves may not extend beyond the next session of the
ioard of Pardons and the board, at that session, shall continue or terminate
tie respite or reprieve, or it may commute the punishment, or pardon the
153
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. — 67A C J.S. Pardon and Parole § 44.
Key Numbers. — Pardon and Parole *» 5.

77-27-8. Record of hearing.
(1) A verbatim record of proceedings before the Board of Pardons shall be
maintained by a certified shorthand reporter or suitable electronic recording
device, except when the board dispenses with a record in a particular hearing
or a portion of the proceedings.
(2) When the hearing involves the commutation of a death sentence, a
certified shorthand reporter, in addition to mechanical means, shall record all
proceedings except when the board dispenses with a record for the purpose of
deliberations in executive session. The compensation of the reporter shall be
determined by the board. The reporter shall immediately file with the board
the original record and when requested shall with reasonable diligence furnish a transcription or copy of the record upon payment of reasonable fees as
determined by the board.
(3) When the party in interest affirms by affidavit that he is unable to pay
for a transcript or copy of the record which is necessary for further proceedings available to him, and that affidavit is not refuted, the board may order
the reporter to furnish to the party in interest a transcript, or a copy of the
record, or so much of it as is reasonably applicable to any farther proceedings,
or a copy of the recording, at the expense of the state, to the party in interest.
History: C. 1953, 77-27-8, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 213, § 4.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1985,

ch. 213, § 4 repealed former § 77-27-8 (L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2), relating to subpoena power,
etc., of board, and enacted present § 77-27-8.

77-27-9. Parole proceedings.
(1) The Board of Pardons may pardon or parole any offender or commute or
terminate the sentence of any offender committed to a penal or correctional
facility which is under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections for a
felony or class A misdemeanor except as otherwise provided in Subsection (2).
The release of an offender shall be at the initiative of the board, which shall
consider each case as the offender becomes eligible. However, a prisoner may
submit his own application, subject to the rules of the board.
(2) (a) A person sentenced to prison for a felony of the first degree involving
child kidnapping, a violation of Section 76-5-301.1; rape of a child, a
violation of Section 76-5-402.1; object rape of a child, a violation of Section
76-5-402.3; sodomy upon a child, a violation of Section 76-5-403.1; aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a violation of Subsection 76-5-404.1(3); or
aggravated sexual assault, a violation of Section 76-5-405, or for a prior
offense as described in Section 76-3-407, is not eligible for release on
parole by the Board of Pardons until the offender has fully completed
serving the minimum mandatory sentence imposed by the court. This
subsection supersedes any other provision of law.
(b) The board may not parole any offender or commute or terminate the
sentence of any offender before the offender has served the minimum
term for the offense, where:
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(i) the offender was convicted of forcible sexual abuse, forcible sodomy, rape, aggravated assault, kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping,
or aggravated sexual assault as defined in Chapter 5, Title 76, and
(ii) the victim of the offense was under 18 years of age at the time
the offense was committed.
(3) The board may issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses
and the production of evidence, to administer oaths, and to take testimony for
the purpose of any investigation by the board or any of its members or by a
designated hearing examiner in the performance of its duties. A person who
willfully disobeys a properly served subpoena issued by the board is guilty of a
class B misdemeanor.
(4) (a) The board may adopt rules consistent with law for its government,
&4fj) meetings and hearings, the conduct of proceedings before it, the parole
^/*jfc£nd pardon of offenders, the commutation and termination of sentences,
and the general conditions under which parole may be granted and re£QM yoked.
^ o (b) The rules shall ensure an adequate opportunity for victims to participate at hearings held under this chapter, as provided in Section
77-27-9.5.
(c) The rules may allow the board to establish reasonable and equitable
time limits on the presentations by all participants in hearings held under this chapter.
(5) The board does not provide counseling or therapy for victims as a part of
their participation in any hearing under this chapter.
History: C. 1953, 77-27-9, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 213, § 5; 1986, ch. 22, § 5; 1986, ch.
41, § 3; 1988, ch. 172, § 3.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1985,
ch. 213, § 5 repealed former § 77-27-9 (L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 1, § 6), relating to
appointment of reporter or recorder, and enacted present § 77-27-9.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment by Chapter 22 in Subsection (1), first sentence, substituted the language beginning "offender committed to" and ending "class A misdemeanor" for "offender imprisoned in a state

prison or county jail for a felony or class A
misdemeanor," and in Subsection (3) deleted a
comma following law."
The 1986 amendment by Chapter 41 substituted "aggravated sexual abuse of a child" for
"sexual abuse of a child" in Subsection (2)(a).
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25,
1988, deleted '"Notwithstanding any other provision of law" at the beginning of Subsection
(2)(a) and added the second sentence thereof;
redesignated former Subsections (4) and (3) as
present Subsections (3) and (4)(a), respectively;
and added Subsections (4)(b), (4)(c), and (5).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Good conduct deduction from sentence.
Constitutionality.
The minimum mandatory sentencing
scheme set forth in Subsections 76-3-201(5),
76-3-406(1), 76-5-404.1(4), and 77-27-9(2) is not
unconstitutionally vague. State v. Gerrish, 746
P.2d 762 (Utah 1987).
The Utah parole statutes do not create a liberty interest recognizable under the federal
constitution. Houtz v. DeLand, 718 F. Supp.
1497 (D. Utah 1989).

Good conduct deduction from sentence.
Under former statute allowing good conduct
deductionsfromsentences, there was no reduction provided where the term of imprisonment
was less than three months. Ex parte Nokes, 6
Utah 106, 21 P. 458 (1889).
State Board of Pardons had jurisdiction and
authority to fix and determine time to be
served by one sentenced under former indeterminate sentence law at any period equal to or
less than maximum penalty provided by law,
and it was not mandatory that it apply "good
conduct time" allowance provided in former
statute. Cardisco v. Davis, 91 Utah 323, 64
P.2d 216 (1937).
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77-27-10. Conditions of parole.
(1) When the Board of Pardons releases an offender on parole, it shall issue
to the parolee a certificate setting forth the conditions of parole which he shall
accept and agree to as evidenced by his signature affixed to the agreement. A
copy of the agreement shall be delivered to the Department of Corrections and
a copy shall be given to the parolee. The original shall remain with the board's
file.
(2) If an offender convicted of violating or attempting to violate Section
76-5-301.1, Subsection 76-5-302(1), Section 76-5-402, 76-5-402.1, 76-5-402.2,
76-5-402.3, 76-5-403, 76-5-403.1, 76-5-404, 76-5-404.1, or 76-5-405 is released
on parole, the board shall order outpatient mental health counseling and
treatment as a condition of parole.
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 77-27-10, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 213, § 6; 1986, ch. 22, § 6.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1985,
ch. 213, § 6 repealed former § 77-27-1C (L
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1983, ch. 88, § 37; 1985, ch.
212, § 22). relating to cooperation of institutions and procedure where indeterminate sentenee imposed, and enacted present § 77-27-10.

Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment, in Subsection (1), in the second sentence
deleted "certified" preceding "copy of the
agreement" and in the third sentence, substit uted "board's" for "board."
C r o s s R e f e r e n c e s . — Indeterminate sentence § 77-18-4.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Propriety, in criminal case, of federal district court order restricting defendants
right to re-enter or stay in United States, 94
A.L.R. Fed 619.

Key Numbers. — Pardon and Parole «=» 5.

77-27-11. Revocation of parole.
(1^ The board may revoke the parole of any person who is found to have
violated any condition of his parole.
(21 If a parolee is detained by the Department of Corrections or any law
enforcement official for a suspected violation of parole, the Department of
Corrections shall immediately report the alleged violation to the board, by
means of an incident report, and make any recommendation regarding the
incident. No parolee may be held for a period longer than 72 hours, excluding
weekends and holidays, without first obtaining a warrant.
(3) Any member of the board may issue a warrant based upon a certified
warrant request to a peace officer or other persons authorized to arrest, detain, and return to actual custody a parolee, and may upon arrest or otherwise
direct the Department of Corrections to determine if there is probable cause to
believe that the parolee has violated the conditions of his parole.
(4) Upon a finding of probable cause, a parolee may be further detained or
imprisoned again pending a hearing by the board or its appointed examiner.
(5' The board or its appointed examiner shall conduct a hearing on the
alleged violation, and the parolee shall have written notice of the time and
place of the hearing, the alleged violation of parole, and a statement of the
evidence against him. The board or its appointed examiner shall provide the
parolee the opportunity to be present, be represented by counsel, to be heard,
to present witnesses and documentary evidence, and to confront and crossexamine adverse witnesses, absent a showing of good cause for not allowing
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ADDENDUM C

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND TOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OP UTAH,
Plaintiff,
VS.

*

MINUTE ENTRY

*

CASE NO. 931901914

*

RICHARD DEE THOMAS,

*
•

Defendant.

The Court has before it a Motion for Counsel and Motion to
Correct

Illegal

Sentence

defendant in this matter.

and

Arrest Judgment,

filed

by

the

The precise basis of the defendant's

Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence is difficult to discern.

It

appears that the defendant is contesting the legality of his
sentence because Third District Court Commissioner Frances M.
Palacios, acting as magistrate, did not have the authority to sign
the Information in this case.
The defendant made a similar argument in State v. Thomas. 961
P.2d 299 (Utah 1998).

In that case, the defendant alleged that

Commissioner Palacios did not have the authority to issue a search
warrant. The Utah Supreme Court agreed that since a search warrant
is essentially an order, the issuance of a search warrant is a core
judicial function which, under Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844
(Utah 1994), commissioners lack the authority to perform.

In its

STATE V. THOMAS

PAGE 2

MINUTE ENTRY

ruling, the court explained that "functions that commissioners can
constitutionally perform are those that constitute recommendations
or other functions that are reviewable by a judge."

Id. at 301.

The court stated that since a search warrant was not subject to
review by a judge "with the possibility of disallowing the search,"
the issuance of a search warrant is a core judicial function.

Id.

It appears that the defendant is again relying on Ohms to
argue that signing an information is a core judicial function which
Commissioner Palacios lacked the authority to perform.

This Court

disagrees that an information can be characterized as a core
judicial function.

Specifically, an information differs from a

search warrant because it does not command any action, but rather
fulfills the requirement of informing a defendant of the charges
against him so that a defense can be initiated.
Moreover,

unlike

a

search

warrant,

an

information

is

"reviewable" in the sense that a judge (Circuit Court Judge Philip
K. Palmer in this case) determines whether the State has presented
the necessary quantum of evidence to bind the matter over for
trial.

Therefore, since Commissioner Palacios1 signature on the

Information merely served as a recommendation which was subject to
review by the judge assigned to determine whether bindover is
appropriate, this Court concludes that it is not a core judicial

STATE V. THOMAS
function.

MINUTE ENTRY
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Accordingly, this Court denies the defendant's pending

Motions.
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the
Court, denying the defendant's Motions.
Dated this

jT)dav

of April, 2001.

PAUL G. MAUGHAN
B£Sj£Bi£T-Jcaini£
STAMP Uf~

"""
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STATE V. THOMAS

MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this
2001:

Erin Riley
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Plaintiff
160 East 300 South, sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah
84114-0854
Richard Dee Thomas #13260
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

day of April,

ADDENDUM D

I»«TRICK

/VNDEKBOH

(#4787)

Attorney for Defendant:

SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
532-5444
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff

FORMAL REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
PURSUANT TO RULE 16 OF THE
RULES OF CRIMINAL/PROCEDURE

v.
RICHARD DEE THOMAS,
Defendant

Case No. 931008943FS
CAO 93-1-89395
COMM. PEUI

COMES NOW the defendant, RICHARD DEE THOMAS, through
his/her attorney, PATRICK ANDERSON, and requests the following
material be provided to him/her as discovery no later than three
days prior to the calendar call presently set for July 13, 1993.
To-wit:
1.

All police reports and investigations concerning the

above-entitled case;
2.

All written or recorded statements of the defendant and

co-defendant(s), if any;
3.

The criminal record of the defendant and the criminal

record including any convictions of any witnesses to be called by
the prosecution;
4.
defendant;

All evidence tending to negate the guilt of the

6.

All evidence tending to mitigate the degree of the

offense for reduced punishment;
7.

All physical evidence taken and all investigative

analysis done on any evidence in the above-entitled case.
As provided in Rule 16, Section 77-35-26(5) (b) , the State
shall make all above disclosures as soon as practicable following
the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead.
DATEQ^this

jjj

day of July, 1993.
Respectfully submitted,

4*t
PATRICK ANDERSON
Attorney for Defendant

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Appearance of
Counsel to the County Attorney Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111 this

day of July, 1993.

DAVID E. YOCOM
|- *. '. P V)
Salt Lake County Attorney \" » '— '— ^
ROBERT L. STOTT, Bar No. 3131 r. cm Q OH
Deputy County Attorney ' 93 JUL IS hl'
231 East 400 South, Suite 300__
, ,.U;T cO'J*7
Salt Lake City, Utah 840i£l^ ^ J*.""^^To\vIS104*
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 SALT U —
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE
THE STATE OF UTAH,

o/UTAH

)

Plaintiff,

)

-vs-

)

RICHARD DEE THOMAS,

)

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR
DISCOVERY
Case No. 931008943FS

Defendant.
Your

general

request

pursuant to State v. Knight,

for

discovery

cannot

be

734 P.2d 913 (Utah, 1987).

honored
Please

find enclosed copies of pertinent documents reflecting only what
is contained in the prosecution file.

Other documents may or may

not exist in individual police agency files and you are directed
to contact these agencies for such information.
The Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney will strictly comply
with the mandates of Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
DATED this 14th day of July, 1993.
DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney

n
ROfiERT L. STOTT ^

k

Denutv Countv Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I

hereby

certify

that

a true and

correct

copy

of

the

foregoing Response to Request for Discovery was delivered to
Patrick Anderson, Attorney for Defendant Richard Dee Thomas at
424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah
/^Ll^day of July, 1993.

/

84111 on the

^3%.

THE UTAH DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS AND COMMERCIAL CODE
HEREBY CERTIFIES THAT
FRANCES M. PALACIOS
is not a commissioned notary public of the State of Utah and for whom a notary
surety bond is not on file in this office,

AS APPEARS OF RECORD IN THE OFFICES OF THE DIVISION:

S*2E§
Paled this

^/0

ZZ
1(UJ

-n>&ZT.
- ^

LyO^zZj^--

gbmut&tartfoe Office of tf>e Courts!
Chief Justioe Michael D. Zimmn in<ii i
3iair Utah Judicial Council

J u l y 5,

1995

Judge Pamela T. Greenwood
Interim State Court Administrator
Myron K. March
Deputy Court Administrator

Richard Dee Thomas
P.O. Box 550
Gunnison, Utah 84634
Dear Mr. Thomas:
Your most recent records request has been forwarded to me
for response • You have apparently requested an oath that is to
be filed under §10-3-828. The section that you have referenced
refers to persons who are officers and administrators of
municipalities. Commissioner Palacios is not an officer or an
administrator of a municipality. Therefore, Commissioner
Palacios has not filed any documents under those sections and is
not required to file any documents under those sections. We
cannot grant your records request.
Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions
Sincerely,

A

Brent Jonnson
Acting General Counsel

. . . The court must also note that the circumstances of
this case do not readily suggest a waiver. This defendant was
arrested at gun point and taken to the police station. There, he
was confronted by a veritable array of officers from several
different law enforcement agencies, accompanied by the United
States Attorney. Despite his requests to be allowed to call his
attorney, he was not permitted to do so until his arraignment the
following day. Under the circumstances, any withdrawal of the
defendant's original insistence that his attorney be present
should not be lightly inferred.

Mr. Thomas should have been afforded an opportunity to use
the telephone and consult with his attorney.
was

broken

and

he

was

coerced

into

Instead, his will

making

incriminating

statements.
No system worth p r e s e r v i n g should have t o fear t h a t i f an accused
i s p e r m i t t e d t o c o n s u l t w i t h a lawyer, he w i l l become aware of,
and e x e r c i s e , t h e s e r i g h t s .
If t h e e x e r c i s e of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
r i g h t s w i l l thwart t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s
of a system of
law
enforcement, then t h e r e i s something very wrong w i t h t h a t system.

Escobedo v . I l l i n o i s , 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
The P o l i c e misconduct i n t h i s c a s e , and t h e c o n t i n u i n g
of t h a t misconduct in compelling Mr. Thomas t o make

taint

incriminating

s t a t e m e n t s , r e q u i r e s t h a t Mr. Thomas's s t a t e m e n t s be suppressed. 4 6
VII
THE PHOTO ARRAY THE POLICE USED WAS OVERLY

SUGGESTIVE

Although motions to suppress the photo array were denied.
[Findings of facts, R. 526-552], at the trial it became clear that
the

witness'

identification

was

the

result

of

the

overly

suggestive photo array. Under cross-examination the Prosecution's
star witness, Mr. Kimball, admitted that the way the photo array

46

The Police made no recording, electronic
confession. [R. 854-1026][Tr. pp 314-19].

or

written

of

the

alleged

abmtniStratibe Office of tftt Courts
Daniel J. Becker
State Court Administrator
Myron K. March
Deputy Court Administrator

1UM_-I1

... MICIUMvtu
L). *-•
Zimmerman
Chicl Justice
v>
Chair Utah Judicial Council

May 1,

1996

Richard Dee Thomas
SMO Dogwood F-2
P.O. Box 550
Gunnison, Utah 84634
Dear Mr. Thomas:
Enclosed please find a requests that is being returned to
you. Judge Phillip K. Palmer is not a justice court judge and
therefore we do not have any documentation on that issue.
Justice court judges are employed by cities and counties. Judge
Palmer is a Circuit Court judge.
As to the request for completion of C.J.A. requirements and
certification of judge, you'll have to be more specific for me to
determine whether such a record exists. Also, any such record
would involve Judge Palmer. You would not be the subject of the
record and payment for copying will be necessary.
Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions.
Sincerely,

Brent Jdhnson
General Counsel
enc.

DEFENDANT:

RICHARD DEE THOMAS

PRISON

RELEASE STATUS:
**....

DEC 1 7 '£33
STATE OF UTAH

SALTLAKECCir.'TX
By

ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

<&

QcJ^iCRlM

I, Philip K. Palmer, Judge of the Circuit Court of the State of Utah, do order that the
defendant be bound over to answer the within charge(s) in the Third District Court in and for
Salt T^frft County, State of Utah. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and
complete copy of all proceedings, and that the papers hereto are all the papers filed with the
Court in said case.

IN WITNESS WHERE OF, I have
hereunto set my hand this 16th day
of December. 1993

CmCUIXXOURTJI3DGE

\

,—./.»:>•*.. ..*•.•«->••**•

v--*—

ADDENDUM E

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
- *

WW

THE STATE OF UTAH.
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT) ..._

Plaintiff.

Case No.
Count No.
Honorable
Clerk
Reporter
Bailiff

vs.

Date

Defendant.

^3KlOt^>H
unlli'*»*t 6
m tZchL^s
K "SClv^l^i^
£>
Cit-o^iA^

fc^

&r:lHik)*

7. ><1?f7

T

D The motion of
to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted b y ) ^ a jury; D the court; Q plea of guilty;
O plea of no contest; of the offense of
Q&6
(Zo&t&yZ'Y
]
, a felony
:
of the _ L _ degree, a a class
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
represented by Ail for)} iZ/ndrWfifrfc* state being represented by
RA^^htL is now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
D to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life;
D not to exceed five years;
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
"BT of not less than five years and which may be for life;
D not to exceed
years;
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $to
D
R
D
D
D

such sentence is to run concurrently with
such sentence is to run consecutively with
upon motion of D State, Q Defense, D Court,
t, Count(s)
Count(s)

are hereby dismissed.

Defendant is granted a stay of the above (Q prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
D Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County • for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
(2 Commitment shall issue
^trctLu)^L^
DATED this

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Uuu^ \^>\

^MLI^

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Defense Counsel

H A n n h / P/Mintw Attr%mt*\/

Page

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
ROBERT L. STOTT, Bar No. 3131
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

7-/3 - 93

/d:ot

Qoimr)

1&-Z-Z/

/.&'<

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Screened by: R. STOTT
Assigned to: R. STOTT

Plaintiff,

BAIL: $100,000.00
I N F O R M A T I O N

-vs-

RICHARD DEE THOMAS,
DOB 3/9/54
OTN 705452
Defendant.

Case No.

9 3 1 0 0 ^ 3 FS

The undersigned R. Dal ling - Salt Lake City Police
Department, under oath states on information and belief that the
defendant, committed the crime of:
COUNT I
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 132 North Redwood
Road, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about June
30, 1993 through July 1, 1993,, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 6, Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, RICHARD DEE THOMAS, a party
to the ojLfense, unlawfully and intentionallyt took personal
property in the possession of "TenBucJcy "Fried Chicken from
the person or immediate presence of Robert Kimball, and in
the course of committing _said,.,jobbery used or threatened the
use of a dangerous weapon, to-wit: a f irearif and/or ^auSeg
serious bodily injury to Robert K i m b a l ^ further, that a
firearm or a facsimile of a firearm or the representation of
a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the
Aggravated Robbery, giving rise to enhanced penalties as
provied by $76-3-202, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.

INFORMATION
STATE OF UTAH V. RICHARD DEE THOMAS
County Attorney No. 93 1 89395
Page 2

THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
R. Jones, Rose Jones, Fred Louis, George Vaughn, Don Bell,
Roc*. Hunt, Scott Williams, Ray Dalling, H. Jackson, Robert
Kin:ball, Curtis Stevens, Jinny Morton, Christina Najera,
Bree Lopez, Wade Campbell, Mindi Gleed, Chad Brown, Julie
Jaeger and Marilyn Walters.

PROBABLE PATIST?

CTA^raraT.

Defendant has admitted to affiant to be the person who on
the above date and place used a gun to rob the Kentucky Fried
Chicken store.

R. DALLING
Affiant
Subscribed and
ne this
C\
1993.

4 v
Authorized for presentment and filing^ :
DAVTD E. YOCOM, County Attorney

A

e^ t~

r Attorney
r
Deputy County
July 6, 1993
msy/93 1 89395

sworn to before
day of July,

R ^ t t S M. PALACIOS

OTN 705452
CAO /93 1 89395
THIRD CIRCUIT C O U ¥ T , STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUMTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
THE STATE OF UTAH,

*

* Before: ____t

Plaintiff,

*

Magistrate

*

vs.

#-.
*
WARRANT OF ARREST
*
*
* Case No.

RICHARD DEE. THOMAS,
DOB 03/09/54
OTN 705452'

*

* 931O0&W3 ps

Defendant.
THE STATE OF UTAH;

To any Peace Officer in the State of Utah, Greetings:
An Information, upon oath, having been this day made before
me by R. Dalling - Salt Lake City Police Department, Agency Case
No, 93-83606, and it appears from the Information or Affidavit
filed with the Information, that there is probable cause to
believe that the public offense of;
Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony, has been
committed, and that RICHARD DEE THOMAS has committed
it,
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to arrest the above-named
defendant forthwith and bring the defendant before this Court, or
before the nearest or most accessible magistrate for setting
baile If the defendant has fled justice, you shall pursue the
defendant into any other county of this state and there arrest
the defendant. The Court finds reasonable grounds to believe
defendant will not appear upon a summons.
Bail is set in the amount of $100,000.00*
Dated this ^2

day of July, A.D. 1993.
Th^s-^ Warrant may be served day or

^ \ j ;
MAGISTRATE v z

\

\$0££j

I

FRANCES M. PALAC10S

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
ROBERT L. STOTT. Bar No. 3131
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South. Suite 300
Sail Lake City, Utah 84 111

Telephone: (801)363-7900

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 931901914FS

RJCHARD DEE THOMAS,

Hon. John A. Rokich

Defendant.
The matter coming before the court on defendant's Motion to Dismiss Information, the
court having read the motion and the State's Answer and Affidavit; and the court having perused
the file and docket entries, hereby ORDERS that the defendant's Motion To Suppress
Information is denied.
As to the speedy trial issue, the reasons for the delay in the case going to trial can be
attributed to the defendant.

Addition.ilh. the defendant has not demonstrated any prejudice

caused b> the delay.
As to the 120 day demand for disposition, the file and docket demonstrated that the
dclcndnnt himself caused the delay bevond the 120 days and that the disposition date has been
properly extended because of his changing of attorneys, his motions, and his requested
continuances.

ORDER
Case No. 931901914FS
Page 2

DATED this 27th day of December, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

JOHN A. ROK1CH, Judge

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I Iiereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was delivered to Mary
C Corporon. Attorney for Defendant Richard Dee Thomas, at 310 South Main Street, Suite
14U0. Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 on the

day of December, 1994.

MEMBERS

UJIW.BOYDEN
ORIAJ.PALACIOS
«Y L WEBSTER

W^ZZ/PASJ
\|?SC^>y
^iliV'

PAULW.SHEFFIELO
Admioittntor

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ORDER OF PAROLE
UTAH STATE OBSCIS NO. 99913260
UTAH STATE PRISON NO. 13260
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THOMAS. RICHARD DEE

This matter of application for parole, termination of sentence, or
expiration of sentence having come before the Utah State Board of Pardons
in a#regularly scheduled hearing on the 21st day of July, 1989, and the
applicant appearing in person or having waived in writing the right to
appearance and the Board having heard the case, issues the following order:
It is hereby ordered that THOMAS, RICHARD DEE be paroled from the
punishment and sentence heretofore imposed upon him/her by a judge of the
Second District Court, Third Circuit Court, Third District C In and for the
County of Davis, Salt Lake for the crime(s) of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, 1st degree
felony. Expiration LIFE: AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, 1st degree felony. Expiration
LIFE; ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY, 3rd degree felony, Expiration; DISTRIBUTING DRUGS
FOR VALUE, 3rd degree felony, Expiration 11/21/93.
The parole shall not become effective until 26th dyr of May. 1992.
The applicant agrees to the conditions of parole and evidences his agreement by
signing the parole agreement. The parole agreement or contract shall be
administered by duly authorized agents of tne Utah State Department of
Corrections for the Utah State Board of Pardons.
It is further ordered that if and in the event the above named applicant
shall be guilty of any infractions of the rules and regulations of the Utah
State Prison or shall fail or refuse to perform duties as assigned by the Utah
State Prison or is found to be in violation of any other law of the State of
Utah prior to the effective date of said parole, then this Order of Parole is
revoked and becomes null and void.
Dated this 21st day of July, 1989.
By Order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this
11th day of August, 1989, reduced its decision in this matter to writing and
hereby affix my signature as Administrator for and on behalf of the State of
Utah, Board of Pardons.

MEMBERS

VLW.BOY0&4

K&HE3PJ&

WUtW.SHCFFiaD

OftA J. PALABOS
W L WEBSTER

W ^ 3 > y
><1!>^

Administrator

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PAROUE AGREEMENT
ihard D. Thomas, agree to be directed and supervised by Agents of the Utah State
tment of Corrections and be accountable for my actions and conduct to Utah State
ctions, according to this Agreement*
ther agree to abide by all conditions of parole as set forth in this Agreement and any
ional conditions as set forth by the Utah State Board of Pardons, consistent
with the
of the State of Utah. I fully understand that the violation of this Agreement and/or any
tious thereof or any new conviction for a crime may result in action by the Board causing
role to be revoked or my parole period to start over.
ELEASE:
ESIDENCE:

XJNDUCT:
SEPORT:

EMPIJGKMENT:

CONDITIONS OF PARO£
On the day of my release from the institution or confinement. I will
report to my assigned Parole Agent, unless otherwise approved in writing.
I shall establish a residence of record and shall reside at such residence
in fact and on record and shall not change my place of residence without
tabwledge of my Parole Agent: and I shall not leave the State of Utah
without prior written authorization from my garole Agent. It is hereby
acknowledged that should I leave the State of Utah without written
authorization from my Parole Agent that I hereby waive extradition, from any
state in which I may be found, to the State of Utah.
I shall obey all State and Federal laws and municipal ordinances at all
times.
I shall make written or in person reports to my Parole Agent by the fifth
of each and every month or as directed and
I snail permit visits to my place
of residence as required by my Parole Ag en t for the purpose of insuring
compliance with the conditions of parole.
I will seek and maintain full-time employment unless I am participating in
an educational or therapy program approved by my Parole Agent.

SEARCH:

WEAPONS:
ASSOCIATION:

compliance with the conditions of my paroIeT
I shall not own, possess, or have under my control,orminmy custody any
I shall not associate with any known criminal in any manner which can
reasonably te expected to result in, or which has resulted in criminal or

SPECIAL CONDITIONS: I shall:
1. Submit to Random Urinalysis.
2. Successfully complete ISP program.
3. Successfully complete Substance Abuse Therapy.
ive read, understand and agree to the above conditions and I hereby acknowledge receipt of
spy of this Agreement.
MESSED BY:
LE:

this

day of

, 19

SIGNED:

Parolee
AMSESS:

inistrator, Board of Bardons
AMENDED 7/26/1988

V ••.

.•• >y

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF

WARRANT FOR ARREST
od• 4 4 i
# _ _ _ _ _

Richard THOMAS
DSP #13260

PZ0

3~7-5«

THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
To any Peaee Officer, State of Utah, Greetings:
A certified Warrant Request having been made before the Board by Arthur Street
and it appears from the Warrant Request or Affidavit filed with the Warrant Request that there is
reason to believe that the parole violation(s) of
1) Curfev Violation;

2) Failure to Maintain Baployaent;

3) Failure to Reside

at Residence of Record

has/have been committed, and that the person named above has committed it/them; and
Whereas the person named above was conditionally released by the Board of Pardons of
the Stale of Utah upon parole on the

13th

day of

A

Pr11

. I9?£

;

YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to arrest the above-named parolee and to
cause him or her to be detained and returned to actual custody pending a determination whether
there is probably cause to believe that the parolee has violated the conditions of his or her parole.
Dated this

18th

day of

, 19 9 3

^

.

Member. Utah!wile Board of Pardons

A

n o 'M r>

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JoiiLJdntion of tiis Status of t ^ ^ ^ ^ . A ^ i ^ L 1 ^

PRISON AO.

±±-yA

i\ii .ivjv.ri.i^uie! m e t e r c xiAc 0:1 : J ; C J isi Jo rat •; oa ;vefo::e tae Jean 5tite Joi-:d
of Parlous on the 2Jrd lay of September, 1997, for:

SPECIAL Axi&liiOli

REVIEW

After a review of the submitted information and good cause appearing, the Board
makes the following decision and order:

RESULTS
Revoke 0 4 / 1 J / 1 9 9 3 p a r o l e . . S c h e d u l e
f o r an P a r o l e V i o l a t i o n / O r i g i n a l Hearing
0V1998.

1° l 1 l l T i
„
1
AGGRAVATEJ LlOBiiZrtY
:
AGGRAVATED fCID^APPlI.
J
ESCAPE Fio.i CUSTODY
>
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY

J_udgo_
"PALLER"

3°.nt J i 3 e .1).
J-L
.I-JJ40
J-L,

o».>
3-L

Ds

.-J.UJ

:R-GJ~^
9J19J19U

cs

.uiirt. v A

BO iLIJG

i;i

expiration
LIFE
LIFE
LIFE
LIFE

Taio iicLs'.oa i.-:. suoject to re viev ini moiif Lcat i ->a by tie board of Pardons at
any Liine until actual release from custody,
B:/ order of tae Board of Pardons of tne State of Utah, 1 aave tais date
23rd day of September, 1997, affixed my signature as Chairman for and
on behalf of tiie State of Utah, Board of Pardons.

In the District Court of Davis County JJ
State of Utah
j,/3&0
THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff

vs.

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
AND COMMITMENT TO THE
UTAH STATE PRISON

RICHARD DEE THOMAS,
„, Defendant

#2-3340

J

That whereas, said defendants

RICHARD DEE THOMAS
NlM

having heretofore on the 1 6 t h day of
Plead

June

.

ttnilfcy

Ptea4 Guilty

or

, A. D. 19-SJL.
in this court „ £ ? .

Ha*n« B m Convicted By • Jury

.

To

charge of Aggravated Rohhpry-and
cZlL2_^l
fo fhp nhargp nf Aggravated Kidnapping.. ^Jl2£^t.

the
Of

C J&
a felony

Name of Crime

and now being present in court, accompanied by his attorney, and rcn<\y for sontence, thereupon the
court renders its judgment as follows:

You,

RICHARD DEE THOMAS _.

_.
having

J?l^^_Guilty
Plead Guilty

or

% the

court adjudges you to

flavin* Been Convicted lly a Jury

be guilty and it is the judgment of the court and the scntoiu e of the law that y« »u
&T£HAJ^DEE.. THOMAS

_

for your said offense do be confined in the Utah State Prison for the term of
-5 y e a r s - t o . i i f e . . £ o r . A g g r a v a t e d RobberJ*.and 5 y e a r s to.life_JLoJC
Aggravated Kidnapping
*+-**** sentence
rr IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the said
-RICHARD .DEE THOMAS--

_ . be sentenced to imprisonment
Nam* ill r^

in the Utah State Prison for a tenn of 15)Five y e a r a. t o X i f e on AggravatedJfcbtery_ t
and (5) F i v e y e a r s t o L i f e on A g g r a v a t e d K i d n a p p i n g t o r u n
utively.
,non
miC
said sentence to begin as of
J u n e Z5, 1980
# j9
NOW, THEREFORE, you .

RICHARD JDEJI. THO.MAS

consec-

.

Name of Prisoner

7*

above named defendant—, are remanded into the custody of Uie Sheriff of Davis County, State of
Utah, to be by him delivered into the custody of the Warden, or other proper officer of said Utah
State Prison in execution of this judgment and sentence.
WITNESS: Honorable

J.

DUFFY PALMER

^

Judge, and the seal of the District Court of the Second Judicial District in and for the State of
Utah affixed this . 2 6 t l l _ _ day of

1
n

L'l

U

i

U

f)/l

u

J*

^

J.un£_. _

_.

, A. D. 19.8.0...

Clerk of the District Court of the Second
Judicial District in and for Davis County,
State of Utah.

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF

ORDER OF PAROLE

ETPKARn THOMAS

UTAH STATE PRISON NO.

13260

PAROLE
matter of application for parole, termination of sentence, or expiration of sentence having come before the
\ State Board of Pardons in a regularly scheduled hearing on the 2 0 t h
day of A u g . 19J3LD, and the
icant appearing in person or having waived in writing the right to appearance and the Board having heard the
, issues the following order:
herby ordered that
R i c h a r d Thomas
be paroled from the punishment and sentence
tofore imposed upon him by a judge of the 2nd , 3 r d Judical District Court in and for the County of Davis, Weber

the crime of r.ranH T.m-rony M - 1 0 y e a r s )
T h e f t - , - 3 r d riegree-..(-Q>-5-gg*E*^
and A g g r a v a t e d Robbery (5 y e a r s - LIFE) and A g g r a v a t e d Kidnapping
- LIFE) C o n s e c u t i v e l y
_T

(5 y e a r s

Darole shall not become effective until the
11 t h
day o f _ A i i g j i & £
19 JLZ.
applicant agrees to the following conditions of parole and evidences his agreement by signing the certificate. The
le agreement or contract shall be administered by the duly authorized agent of the Utah State Adult Probation
Parole Department in and for the Utah State Board of Pardons.
further ordered that if and in the event the above named applicant shall be guilty of any infractions of the rules
regulations of the Utah State Prison or shall fail or refuse to perform duties as assigned by the Utah State Prison
i found to be in violation of any other law of the State of Utah prior to the effective date of said parole, then this
er of Parole or Termination of Sentence is revoked and becomes null and void.

5d this

20th

"•

day of

August

1980

)rder of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this 2 1 s t
day of
August
19 8 0 .
iced its decision in this matter to writing and hereby affix my signature as Executive Secretary for and on behalf
ne State of Utah, Board of Pardons.
f|fl - | | \ \
1 ^

iv. Thomas i s convicted on any new f e l o n i e s
GAR>f
»r t h i s date (8-20-80) case t o be
sirred back to t h e Board.
PAROLE AGREEMENT
RICHARD THOMAS

L.QwEBSTER, Executive Secretary

Hereby agree to abide by the following

ditionsof my parole:
1. I will make a written report, in person, to my Supervising Officer by the fifth day of each and every month,
or more often if requested to do so.
2. I will follow my Supervising Officer's instructions.
3. I will submit to a search of my person, auto, place of residence of any other property under my control at
any time of the day or night, without a warrant, upon reasonable cause, as ascertained by an agent of Adult
Probation and Parole, to insure compliance with the conditions of parole.
4. I will seek and maintain legitimate employment and/or participate in a program approved by my Supervising
Officer.
5.

I will obey all local, State and Federal laws, and at all times conduct myself as a responsible, law-abiding
citizen. I further agree to report any arrests or citations to my Supervising Officer within 72 hours of occurrence.
6. I will abstain from the illegal use, possession or distribution of narcotics, dangerous drugs, controlled substances or related paraphernalia. I further agree to submit to urinalysis or other tests for narcotics or chemical agents upon the request of my Supervising Officer.
7. I will not receive, possess, transport, or have under my control any firearm, explosive or other dangerous
weapon.
8. I will obtain written consent from Utah Adult Probation and Parole before leaving the State of Utah. It is
expressly acknowledged that should I leave the State of Utah without written authority from Adult Probation and Parole that I hereby waive extradition, from any state in which I may be found, to the State of
Utah.
9. I will inform my Supervising Officer of my intent to change employment residence.
10. To avoid association with any person who has been convicted of a felony.
11. I will abide by the following special conditions:

I understand and agree that should I violate any of the above conditions, falsify reports required of me, or fail
to follow the orders of my Supervising Officer, I shall be subject to arrest as provided by law.
I have read, understand and agree to the above conditions and have received a copy of this agreement.
WITNESSED BY:

This

day of

19

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF

RICHARD THOMAS
USP 013260

LAW AND
ORDER

The above entitled matter came on for hearing before
the Board of Pardons, State of Utah, on this 20th day of August
1980.

The following Members of the Board were sitting:

Mr,

Thomas R. Harrison, Chairman, Mr. Jose I. Ferran, Jr., and Mr,
Daily Oliver, Member.

Also present was Mr. Alan Anthony, Hear-

ing Officer, Board of Pardons.

Mr. David Bown, attorney-at-law,

appearing as counsel for Mr. Richard Thomas.

The parolee was

previously given a written notice of the alleged parole violation and the date of this hearing.

The Board having disclosed

the evidence against the parolee, having allowed the parolee
the opportunity to be heard, to present witnesses and documentary
evidence, and to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses,
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That RICHARD THOMAS was paroled from the Utah

State Prison on the 12th day of February 1980.
2*

That complaint was made to the Board of Pardons by

the Department of Adult Probation and Parole, that the said
RICHARD THOMAS had violated the conditions of his Parole.
3.

That RICHARD THOMAS was arrested on the 18th day

of March 1980 and housed in the Davis County Jail.
4.

That RICHARD THOMAS waived his rights to a pre-

revocation hearing on April 21, 1980.
5.

That RICHARD THOMAS was scheduled for a parole vio-

lation hearing before the Board of Pardons on June 4, 1980,
and at that time Mr. Thomas 1 case was heard and it was the
decision of the Board that the case be continued pending outcome of Court Action.

The case was continued to July 9, 1980.

However, on July 9, 1980, Court action had not been
and the Board continued

the case without date.

completed

On July 17,

1980, it was noted that Richard Thomas escaped from the Utah
State Prison and was returned to the Utah State Prison on
July 31, 1980.
6.

That RICHARD THOMAS on the 20th day of August 1980,

appeared before the Board of Pardons and was charged with
violation of his Parole in the following particulars:
1.

Having been convicted upon a plea of guilty
to the charge of Aggravated Robbery, a 1st
degree felony, on or about the 16th day of
June, 1980 in the District Court of Davis
County, State of Utah, in violation of Condition
Number Six of his Parole Agreement.

2.

By having been convicted upon a plea of guilty
to the charge of Aggravated Kidnapping, a 1st
degree felony, on or about the 16th day of June
1980, in the District Court of Davis County,
State of Utah, with the sentence for said conviction to run consecutively with the sentence
for the Aggravated Robbery conviction of the
same date, in violation of Condition Number
Six of his Parole Agreement.

7. That RICHARD THOMAS was advised of his rights by the
Board of Pardons on this 20th day of August 1980, and Mr.
Thomas pled guilty to Counts #1 and #2. Based upon evidence
presented to the Board and a commitment (Case $2-3340)
on Counts $1 and 02 for the crimes of Aggravated Robbery
(5 years - Life) and Aggravated Kidnapping (5 years - Life)
sentences to run consecutively, the Board found probable
cause to revoke the parole of RICHARD THOMAS.
The Board having made the foregoing Findings of Fact
hereby enters these:

1.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
That RICHARD THOMAS was lawfully paroled.

2.

That RICHARD THOMAS was charged with violation

of his parole.
3. That RICHARD THOMAS was afforded all of his
Constitutional and Statutory rights and privileges.
4.

That RICHARD THOMAS did in fact violate his

parole as shown above.
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parole granted RICHARD
THOMAS on the 12th day of February 1980, be and the same is
hereby revoked as of the 20th day of August 1980, and a new
parole release date granted, effective the 11th day of August
1987.
Dated this 20th day of August 1980.

ITCtMkKK.^HARRISON
^
Chairman-Board of Pardons
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Findings and Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Order to RICHARD THOMAS, Draper, Utah
this ';** day of '•/, / .. .- .
198G.
>/
' '

\

<* M J_ / L,-'

NORMA A. DANNELS

GARY(J-. WEBSTER
Executive Secretary

^
& *
lorman H. Bif>9#f1#r
Governor

H.L (P«t«) Haun
Chairman

Donatd E. Blanchard
MlchMl R. SJbb«t
Curtis LGamar
Cteryt Hanaan

/ ^ j

\r--

s.*/

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of
the Alleged Parole
Violation of RICHARD
DEE THOMAS, USP #13260

Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law

PUBLIC

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the
Board of Pardons on March 8, 1993. Board Members present were
Curtis L. Garner and Donald E. Blanchard. Appearing for the
State of Utah was Lori Lima, Deputy Attorney General, and Agent
Michael Sorensen of Adult Probation and Parole. Parolee Richard
Dee Thomas was presented and represented by counsel, James Lewis,
Richard Dee Thomas was given written notice of the the
allegations of parole violation and the date of this hearing.
The Board, having disclosed the evidence against the parolee and
having allowed the parolee the opportunity to be heard, to
present witnesses and documentary evidence, and to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses, makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That RICHARD DEE THOMAS was paroled from the Utah State
Prison on the 22nd day of September, 1992.
2. That RICHARD DEE THOMAS was arrested on allegations of
parole violation on or about the 6th day of October, 1992.
3. That on the 8th day of March, 1993, RICHARD DEE THOMAS
was brought before the Board of Pardons and charged with ^
violation of his parole in the following particulars: .*Tkt^
1) By having tailed to stabilize in the Ogden Community
^f\^\
Correctional Center program on October 6, 1992, in violation of
/)(5\ v/jb'
special condition number 5 of his parole agreement.
J A /A '
2) By having failed to submit to urinalysis on October
6, 1992 in violation of special condition number 3 of his oarole
acrreement,
3) By having used, possessed, controlled, delivered,
produced, manufactured, or distributed contolled substances or
other drugs on or about October 6, 1992, in violation on
condition number 3 of his parole agreement.

4. That, RICHARD DEE THOMAS is not guilty of allegation
number one and guilty of allegation number two. Allegation
number three was dismissed by the Board on parolee's motion at
the conclusion of the State's evidence, for lack of evidence.
Having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Board hereby
enters these:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

PUBLIC

That RICHARD DEE THOMAS was lawfully paroled.

2. That RICHARD DEE THOMAS was charged with violation of his
parole3. That RICHARD DEE THOMAS was afforded all of his
Constitutional and statutory rights and privileges.
4.

That RICHARD DEE THOMAS did in fact.violate his parole.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parole granted RICHARD DEE THOMAS
on the 22nd day of Novemberf 1992, be and the same is hereby
revoked, and a new parole release date of April 13, 1993 is
hereby granted with the following special conditions:
1
2
3
4

Successfully complete
Successfully complete
Submit to random drug
Successfully complete

ISP program.
electronic monitoring.
testing.
a substance abuse program.

Dated this 10th day of March, 1993

Board Member

•ty/**^ s ^ ^/- /?,£

State of Utah

72* /fO)A/ /%y 7 ^ -

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
UTAH STATE PRISON
Norman H. Bangerter
Governor
O. L a n e M c C o t t e r
Exccuuve Director

C. Kim Thompson
tor Institutional Operations

P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
(801)571-2300

March 20, 1992

Richard Dee Thomas #13260
Uinta II
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
Dear Mr. Thomas:
You are instructed to process the complaints set forth in your
January 23, 1992, letter to me through the appropriate grievance or
classification procedure. As you are aware, these procedures
facilitate the systematic collection and assessment of the relevant
facts required to make an informed decision.
It is our opinion that the Department has been exempted from the
provisions of the "Administrative Procedures Act". Accordingly, your
request for "Administrative Forms" will not be granted. The opinion
expressed is based upon the following from U.C. 63-46b-l(2)(c):
"The £TO visions of this chapter do not govern: state agency actions
related to extradition, to the granting of pardons o r parole,
commutat ions or terminations of sentences, or to the recision,
terminat ion, or revocation of parole, or probation, to actions and
deci sion s of the Psychiatric Security Review Board r elating to
discharg e, conditional release, or retention of pers ons under its
jurisdic tion, to the discipline of, resolution of, g rievances of.
supervis ion of, confinement of, or the treatment of" inmates or
r e s i d e n t s of any c o r r e c t i o n a l f a c i l i t y , t h e Utah S t a t e H o s p i t a l ,
the Utah S t a t e Development C e n t e r , o r p e r s o n s i n t h e c u s t o d y or
j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e D i v i s i o n of Mental H e a l t h , or pe r s o n s on
p r o b a t i o n o r p a r o l e , o r j u d i c i a l review of t h o s e a c t i o n s
(emphasis added)
Sincerely,

(0*>db*ji2i
0. Lane M c C o t t e r , ^ c e c u t i v ^ ^ i r e c t o r
Utah Department of C o r r e c t i o n *

IN T H E T H I R D JUDICIAL D I S T R I C T C O U R T
I N A N D FOR SALT LAKE C O U N T Y , S T A T E O F U T A H

37-51

THE STATE OF UTAH.
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff.

cjase No
Count No.
Honorable

vs.

fZV \M K%

Cloo^ ~TUQ W\ Cr A
V

T>ft
L

H » ^ 6 3 ^

Clerk

Cit-5?)

Reporter
Bailiff
Date

Defendant.

A'ffift\ rq^gs

D The motion of
to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason wpy sentenceshould not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted b v D a jury; D the court; aitflea of guilty;
D plea of no contest; of the offense of
, A t f g / i M p l - P r J — Q th4yv t V) ufofarYl^
'
. a felony
of the - j y * ^ degree, D a class
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
represented by Q» rfnv\
and the State being represented by (^\^J&\d^J^t
is now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
D n / a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life;
Oknot to exceed five years;
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
D of not less than five years and which may be for life;
D not to exceed
years;
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $_
to
sentence is to run concurrently with ff ^ y u ^ tfip/A^PM^al
D such sentence is to run consecutively with
motion 01
of u
D oiaie.
State, D
Defense, u
Du
Court,
Count(s) r
•D upon
upori mouon
u ueiense,
o u n , uouni(s)p
LT SU<
such

\fmrfciAAfr (A \n WrrAsfP.

r . r M i f V n k*Mo*

Ex "*r -AlA yerl
are hereby dismissed/

.<*i\\ierf A\hJro.

n(Arn^

D Defer
rVdant is granted a stay of the above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation In the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of A d u l t
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached concHHons of probation.
GO/Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County BUdfdelivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
ahd imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
LVCommitment shall issue - J n a d i l U i o i l ^ DATED this

32-n ay of

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
I S T I ^ f T COURT JUDGE
Defense Counsel

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEY

.
/V\

__
P^

D

JLERK
CL
r>nrni»»/ fmmtv

Attnrnpv

By

e^ojy

Page

\

of

Circuit Court, State of Utah
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

J:?rdi.A

6A

Uiai^
Plaintiff
COMMITMENT

vs
^L\Cv^x ' <- ?

After Judgment

i

.' !

v/H^

CRIMINAL NO.
Address
DOB

3 </V/

Defendant

THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH:
On the

/>

day of

.,19 ^fO, the above

0 ^

named defendant was brought before a judge ofAhe Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
charged with having committed the crime of.

The defendant was found guilty and was sentenced to ptiyafinnnft
/

—l\fCQr if

days in the Gotmly Jail with

tind tn t?tnr

days in the jail to be suspended upuu puynwat of

The fine has not been paid, nor secured, nor has an appeal been taken;
You arc* hereby commanded to take said defendant Into custom1 II v H 11 n II 'i ill t11 v k i" PJ > ii H 11111 f /" she shall Sn vc
out the above-named term of imprisonment or shall pay S . , _
f o r 4m**h~-

••

—

Dated „•, E^J^TMYlA

—

71

,

rr' to nxceed one dzy

ruriine.
V _ ,11)
^

/ Cifciit Jifdge^'' -%: *v*'-*"*. - - ^ ^

*/<S*&

mti

nJ e D a r t m e n ^ i Administrative S e n v,si

M i c h a e l O. L c a v n t
K a y k - n i M . . I i c i„ : ,, 1c ,
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ADDENDUM F

STATE v. THOMAS
CttcatMt TM 2*9 (ttth 1998)

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff
and Respondent
Richard Dee THOMAS, Defendant
and Petitioner
No §70049.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 22, 1998.
Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, William B.
Bohling, J., of aggravated robbery. The
Court of Appeals affirmed and certiorari was
granted. The Supreme Court, Russon, J.,
held that (1) court commissioner could not
constitutionally issue search warrant given
that issuing search warrant was core judicial
function involving ultimate judicial power,
and (2) defendant inadequately briefed photo
array issue.

search warrant is prospective, and any prior
search warrant issued by commissioner is
valid under de facto doctrine, except that
present defendant would be given benefit of
his victory, in making his constitutional challenge. Const Art 8, § 1; U.CJU953, 78-331,78-3-31(6)(a).
5. Court Commissioners G=>3
Holding in Ohms prohibiting court commissioners from performing core judicial
functions did not deinstitutionalize court
commissioners given that court commissioners are still able to perform many important
functions in assistance to courts such as conducting factfindinghearings, holding pretrial
conferences, and making other recommendations to judges. Const Art 8, § 1; i l C A
1:953, 78-3-31.

6. Court Commissioners $=»3
Issuance of search warrant is core judicial function, which court commissioners lack
authority to perform, though statute pui
ports
to give such authority to magistrates,
Reversed in part, affirmed in part and
which
term includes commissioners, given
remanded
that issuing search warrant could not be
characterized as permissible functions of
commissioner of either recommendation to
1. Certiorari ^63.1
On certiorari, Supreme Court reviews judge or other action reviewable by judge,
decision of Court of Appeals,, not decision of and, when judge issues law enforcement order to search and seize, judge simultaneously
trial court
exercises power and authority to enforce
2. Certiorari e=»64(l)
such order, and once armed with issued warOn certiorari, Supreme Court review*, rant, law enforcement proceeds to search and
Court of Appeals' decision for correctnesK seize at will. Const Art. 8, § 1; U.C.A.1953,
and gives its conclusions of law no dpfervwi
77-1.-3, 77-23-201, 78-8-81, 78-3-31 (6)(a).
3. Officers and Public Employees ^ 4 3
Under doctrine of Mde facto authority,"
actions performed by those without actual
authority are validated when they are performed by one who, under the color of law,
assumes to exercise official authority, is reputed to have it and the community ac
quiesces accordingly.

7. Court Commissioners £»3
Core judicial functions can be performed
only by duly appointed judges, and not by
court commissioners, and thus, only duly appointed judges can issue search warrants.
Const Art 8, § 1.

Sec publication Words and Phrases,
for other judicial constructions and ' 1
initions.

Due to defendant's lack of analysis, issue
of whether trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress a positive eyewitness
identification made from suspect photo array
was inadequately briefed, and thus, Court of
Appeals was justified in declining to address
it Rules App.Proc., Rule 24(a)(9),

4. Court Commissioners *»3
Courts e»100(l)
Instant decision, holding that court commissioner does not have authority to issue

riminal Law e=>1130(5)
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then released, and the assailant ran away.
Shortly thereafter, police officers arrived on
the scene and began their investigation of the
robbery. As part of their investigation, they
received a lead on a suspect who was report10. Criminal Law e= 1130(5)
ed to be in a nearby apartment. The suspect
While failure to cite to pertinent authori- was defendant Richard Dee Thomas. When
ty may not always render an issue inade- the police arrived at the apartment, a conquately briefed, it does so when the overall frontation ensued with Thomas. The officers
analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift forced entry into the apartment but retreatthe burden of research and argument to the ed after Thomas threatened to kill a hosreviewing court Rules AppJProc, Rule tage.1 'Then, while some officers guarded the
24(a)(9).
apartment, others went to obtain, a search
warrant
9. Criminal Law C=»1130(61
Reviewing court will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed.
Rules App.Proc, Rule 24(a)(9).

During the early morning of July 1, 1993,
Third District Court Commissioner Frances
M. Palacios issued a search warrant After
obtaining the search warrant, the police officers returned to the scene. Shortly thereafter, Thomas surrendered, and the apartment
was searched. During the search, the police
On Certiorai I to the I Ita h Com t of l!!i pp eal s
seized evidence linking Thomas to the crime.
On July 2, 1993, the manager of the restauRUSSON, Justice:
We granted certiorari to review the Utah rant was shown a photo array of six men and
Court of Appeals' decision that our holding in identified Thomas as the man who committed
Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 PJ2d 844 (Utah the robbery. During interrogation and after
1994) (prohibiting court commissioners from Thomas waived his Miranda rights, Thomas
performing core judicial functions), does not confessed to committing the armed robbery.
apply to the issuance of a search warrant by On July 6, 1993, the State filed an informaa court commissioner. We are also asked to tion against Thomas, charging him with agreview the court of appeals' refusal to ad- gravated robbery, a first degree felony, in
dress defendant's claim that the trial court violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302.
erred in denying his motion to suppress a Thomas pleaded not guilty.
positive eyewitness identification made from
Prior to trial, Thomas moved to suppress
a suspect photo array. The court of appeals' evidence obtained during the search. Thomrefusal was based upon inadequate briefing. as cited Salt Lake City v. Ohms and argued
State v. Thomas, No. 960170-CA, slip op. that the issuance of a search warrant consti(CtApp. November 29, 1996) (memorandum tutes a fundamental court function and thus
decision), cert granted 937 P.2d 136 (Utah the search and seizure were unconstitutional
1997). We reverse as to the applicability of in that the court commissioner who issued
Ohms and affirm as to the refusal to address the search warrant lacked the authority to do
the photo array issue.
so. This motion was denied. Thomas also
moved to suppress eyewitness identification,
arguing, inter alia, that the photo array of
O n y ^ jujgiit of June 30, 1993, an armed the six men was unduly suggestive. This
motion was also denied. On August 4, 1995,
robbery was committed at a fast food restaua jury convicted Thomas as charged.
rant in Salt Lake County, Utah. At gun
point, the assailant ordered the manager to
On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals,
put all the money into a bag and to accompa- Thomas asserted, inter alia, that the trial
ny him to the parking lot The manager was court erred when it denied Thomas's motion
Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., Joanne C. Slotnik,
Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Bel-Ami Demontreux, Salt Lake Cit} , for
Defendant and Petitioner.

I

It latei turned out that there was no hostage.
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to suppress evidence and Ms motion to suppress eyewitness identification.. In an unpublished memorandum decision, the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's rulings.
Thomas then petitioned this court for certiorari review, .and we granted the petition,
ANALYSIS

Ohms had prospective application and therefore was inapplicable U) Thomas's case because the search warrant pre-dated our ruling in Ohms; (2) Thomas's assertion that
court commissioners have no power was too
broad a reading of Ohms since only the
exercise of core judicial functions by court
commissions was prohibited; and (3) Ohms
did not apply because the issuance of a
search warrant is not a core judicial function.
We address these holdings in turn.

[1,2] "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals, not the decision
of the trial court" State v. Harmon, 910
?2d 1196,1199 (Utah 1995). "We review the
[3] In Ohms, Ohms had "been charged
court of appeals* decision for correctness and
give its conclusions of law no deference." with giving false or misleading information to
Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P2d a police officer, a class C misdemeanor, in
M, 350 (Utah 1997),
violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance
§ 11.04.100. Ohms was tried, convicted, and
sentenced by a court commissioner pursuant
The first issue we address is whether the to Utah Code Ann. § 7&-3-31(6)(a) (1992).*
court of appeals erred when it held that Salt Ohms appealed to this court, arguing that a
Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994), court commissioner did not have the authoridid not apply to the issuance of a search ty to enter a final judgment of conviction and
warrant Before the court of appeals, Thom- impose sentence, as such was an unconstituas argued that court commissioners do not tional exercise of ultimate judicial power.
have the authority to issue search warrants. We agreed and held that court commissionIn a rather scant summary disposition of the ers cannot exercise a judge's ultimate judicial
issue, the court of appeals disagreed, simply power or, in othei words, cannot perform
core judicial functions. In so holding, we
stating:
Thomas relies on Salt Lake City v. Ohms found significant the fact that "[cjourt comfor the proposition that "the Utah Su- missioners are employees of the judiciary,
preme Court, on August 18,1994, held that not duly appointed judges," and that commisUtah Code Annotated § 78-3-51 (1992), sioners are not subject to the "constitutional
that gave to Utah court commissioners checks and balances" to which duly appointed
their powers was unconstitutional." In ad- judges are subject Ohms, 881 P.2d at 851.
dition to having prospective application, We thus found section 78-3-31(6)(a) unconThomas's reading of Ohms is too broad stitutional because it delegated the core judiand does not apply to the issuance of a cial functions of entering final judgment and
search warrant
imposing sentence to a court commissioner.
Thomas, slip op. at 1 (citation omitted).
Under the doctrine of de facto authority,3 we
Although the court of appeals should have validated the past actions of court commiselaborated to make its ruling more clear, the sioners who had engaged in the unconstituessence of its holding appears to be that (1) tional exercise of core judicial functions,
1 Utah Code Ann § 78-3-3l(6Xa) (1992) stated
TTie court commissioner may accept pleas of
guilty or no contest, impose sentence, and enter final judgment in misdemeanor cases.
Upon the informed consent of the defendant,
the court commissioner may conduct a jury or
nonjury misdemeanor trial in accordance with
the law. Upon conviction, the commissioner
may impose sentence and enter final judgment.
The judgment entered by the commissioner

shall be the final judgment of the coin i fi i all
| imposes, including appeal.
3.

Under this doctrine, actions performed by
those without actual authority are validated
when they are performed by one who, under the
color of law, " 'assumes to exercise official authority, is reputed to have it, and the community
acquiesces accordingly.'" Ohms, S81 P.2d at
854 (quoting Hussey v. Smith, 99 U.S. 20, 24, 25
L.Ed. 314(1878)).
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[4] Given only 'the court of appeals'1 conclusive statement, we assume that it agreed
with the State's argument that Thomas was
precluded from challenging commissioner actions because we limited Ohms to prospective
application and the search warrant was issued some fourteen months prior to Ohms.
Indeed, a review of the record reveals that
the search warrant was issued on July 1,
1993, over thirteen months prior to the Ohms
decision. However, while we stated in Ohms
that "actions taken by commissioners in the
past are not subject to challenge since court
commissioners in those cases acted with de
facto authority," we declined to apply the de
facto doctrine to Ohms as he had "sustained
the burden of attacking an unconstitutional
statute." To hold otherwise and deprive an
appellant of "the fruits of victory" would have
the effect of "discouraging challenges to statutes of questionable validity." Ohms, 881
P.2d at 854-55. In the case before us, by
arguing that the issuance of a search warrant
m a core judicial function, Thomas, like
Ohms, is attacking the constitutionality of a
court commissioner's exercise of power.
Thus, if Thomas sustains 'this burden, and we
hold that he does, then the de facto doctrine
would not apply to him for the same reasons
it did not apply to Ohms. As in Ohms, our
decision today is prospective, and any search
warrants issued by court commissioners in
the past are valid, as they were issued with
de facto authority. Id.
B

The Power of Court Commissioners

[5] Thomas argued before the com of
appeals that our decision in Ohms held section 78-3-31 unconstitutional and thus "deconstitutionalized court commissioners."
The court of appeals dismissed this argument
as going beyond what was actually held in
Ohms. The court of appeals is correct In
Ohms, we clearly stated that section 78-^3-31
violated the Utah Constitution "to the extent
that it purports to vest ultimate judicial power of courts of record in persons who have
not been duly appointed as article VIII
judges." Id. at 855 (emphasis added). We
also acknowledged that court commissioners
"may perform many important functions in

assistan.ce to courts" such as conducting fact
finding hearings, holding pretrial conferences, and making other recommendations to
judges. In fact, we specifically stated that
"our decision in no way affects the authority
and functions that court commissioners have
eitfoyed for over thirty years and will undoubtedly continue to er\joy in the future."
Id. at 851-52 n. 17. Nowhere in Ohms did we
"deconstitutionalize" the court commissioner
system.
C

Issuance of a Search Warrant
as a Core Judicial Function

I ru court of appeals also held that Ohms
did nc, apply because the issuance of a
search warrant is not a core judicial function.
This is a question of first impression.
In Ohms, we stated that core judicial functions include (1) "the power to hear and
determine controversies between adverse
parties and questions in litigation/ " (2)" the
authority to hear and determine justiciable
controversies/ " (3)" the authority to enforce
any valid judgment decree or order'" and
(4) "all powers that are 'necessary to protect
the fundamental integrity of the judicial
branch/ " Id at 849 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Core judicial functions do not
include functions that are generally designed
to "assist" courts, such as conducting fact
finding hearings, holding pretrial conferences, and making recommendations to
judges. In these instances, the commissioners' actions are reviewable by a judge; thus,
ultimate judicial power remains with the
.judge Id. at 851 n. 17
[6] Turning to the present case, it is well
established that a search warrant is an order.
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-201 (1995) (defining search warrant as "an order issued by
a magistrate in the name of the state and
directed to a peace officer," describing the
search and property to be seized); 1933 Revised Statutes of Utah § 105-54-1 (stating
that "[a] search warrant is an order in writing, in the name of the state, signed by a
magistrate and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the magistrate"),
quoted in Allen v. Holbrook 103 Utah 319,
135 P2d 242, 247-48 (1943); see also 79
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fXS. Searches and Seizures § 128 (1995). warrant is issued, we have no difficulty in
When a judge issues to law enforcement an granting the issuance of a search warrant
order to search and seize, the judge simulta- core function status.
neously exercises the power and authority to
[7] The State proffers two arguments as
enforce such an order, because once armed
with an issued warrant, law enforcement pro- to why court commissioners have the authoriceeds to search and seize at will. Thus, ty to issue search warrants. First, the State
because a search warrant is an order and the claims that commissioner authority to issue
i^uer possesses the authority to enforce the search warrants stems from their status as
order, the issuance of a search warrant is a magistrates, who possess the clear statutory
core judicial function, which commissioners^_ grant of power to issue search warrants.
Section 77-1-3 does define a magistrate as "a
lack the authority to perform.
justice or judge of a court of record or not of
This holding is buttressed by the fact that
record or a commissioner of such a court
the right to be free from unreasonable
appointed in accordance with Section 78-3marches and seizures embodied in the Utah
31," and section 78-7-17.5(1 )(c) does vest au4
and United States Constitutions is one of
thority in magistrates to 'issue . . . warrants
the most fundamental and cherished rights
of search." However, as we have outlined
we possess. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470
above, Ohms held that under the Utah, Conl\S. 753, 758,105 S.Ct 1611, 84 L.Ed.2d 662
stitution core judicial functions can be per<19S5) ("The Fourth Amendment protects
formed only by duly appointed judges.
... 'therightto be let alone—the most comThus, in accordance with our holding today,
prehensive of rights and the right most valonly duly appointed judges can issue search
ued by civilized men.'" (quoting Olmstead v.
warrants. Court commissioners are not
Vmted States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S.Ct
judges, and thus they cannot issue search
5«. 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., diswarrants. Any attempt by the legislature to
senting))); Camara v. Municipal <X 387
statutorily confer the power to issue search
US. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930
warrants upon court commissioners would be
1967) ("The Fourth Amendment thus gives
null and void as a violation of the Utah
concrete expression to a right of the people
Constitution. We do not hold the abovewhich is 'basic to a free society.'" (quoting
stated statutes unconstitutional, however, be'Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27, 69 S.Ct
cause section 78-7-17.5(1) clearly grants
1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949))); Harris v. Unitmagistrates the power to issue search wared States, 331 U.S. 145,150, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91
rants, "[ejxeept as otherwise provided by
LEd. 1399 (1947) ("This Court has consislaw."
tently asserted that the rights of privacy and
personal security protected by the Fourth
Second, the State argues that the issuance
Amendment'... are to be regarded as of the of a search warrant is not a core judicial
very essence of constitutional liberty; and function involving the exercise of ultimate
that the guaranty of them is as important judicial power but rather involves a nonadjuand as imperative as are the guaranties of dicative preliminary matter that simply asthe other fundamental rights of the individu- sists the court in moving the case along.
al citizen ....'" (quoting Gouled v. Untied Certainly, many Actions are capable of "asStates, 255 U.S. 298, 304, 41 S.Ct 261, 65 sisting" courts, including the performance of
LEd. 647 (1921))), overruled in part by Chi- . core judicial functions. Thus, determining
»>W v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct whether a particular action assists a court
3»4< 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). Given the mag- does not end the inquiry, As we have noted,
nitude of the right at risk when a search .functions that commissioners can constitu* The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which is practically identical to article I. section 14 of the Utah Constitution, states:
flie right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not

be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
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tionally perform air I how that constitute
recommendations or other functions that are
reviewable by a judge. Issuing a search
warrant cannot be characterized as either a
recommendation or an action that is reviewable by a judge. The commissioner in this
case did not recommend to the judge that the
warrant be issued but rather issued it herself. Similarly, the decision to issue was not
subject to review by a judge with the possibility of disallowing the search. Rather, the
order to search and seize was issued and
then executed immediately thereafter. Furthermore, while the issuance of a search
warrant is a "preliminary" decision when
looking at a criminal prosecution as a whole,
it is a final decision as to whether a search
will occurT'Thus, while issuing a search warrant does not rise to the level of finality as
entering judgment and imposing sentence, as
was disallowed in Ohms, it is sufficiently final
to establish it as a core judicial function. We
thus hold that because the issuance of a
search warrant is a core judicial function,
which cannot be performed by a court commissioner, the court of appeals erred when it
held that Ohms did not apply.
Thomas also objects to a court commissioner presiding over his first appearance. He
argues that, similar to issuing a search warrant, presiding over a first appearance is a
core judicial function that commissioners lack
the authority to perform. However, Thomas
fails in his brief to identify or describe this
hearing or discuss what the commissioner's
actions were and how these actions constituted the exercise of core judicial functions.
Thomas cited only to the Third Circuit
Court's docket sheet stating that a first appearance took place. A review of the record
reveals no further evidence of the first appearance. It does show, however, that
Thomas's preliminary hearing was held before Circuit Court Judge Phillip K. Palmer
and that it was he who bound Thomas over
for trial in Third District Court Rule
24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires an appellant's argument to
contain the "reasons of the appellant with
respect to the issues presented . . . with citations to the . . . parts of the record relied
on." Thomas has failed to comply with these
requirements. Hi* brief m totally inu'iif-

quali1 unci uiffTiliniM we derlint U> address
this issue,
II
[8] The second 'issue we address is
whether the court of appeals erred when it
declined to address Thomas's claim that the
trial court erred in denying .'his motion to
suppress a positive eyewitness identification
made from a suspect photo array because
Thomas failed to adequately brief the issue.
The court of appeals stated:
Thomas ignores several decisions address
ing proper challenges to photo array cases.
See State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1111
(Utah 1994); State v. Thamer, 111 P2d
432, 435 (Utah 1989). Because Thomas
fails to adequately brief this argument, it is
without merit and we decline to address it
See Utah R-App. P. 24(a)(9) (requiring "ti
tations to the authorities [and] statutes
relied on").
Thomas, slip op. at 3.
A review of the record reveals that Thorn
as devoted four pages of his brief before the
court of appeals to his photo array argument
However, almost three of these pages con
sisted of direct quotes from the trial transcript On the basis of the trial testimony,
Thomas then asserted that the photo arraj
was overly suggestive. His only reference to
any legal authority is contained in the bald
assertions that the
identification also taints any other identification of Mr. Thomas in violation of due
process under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. The overly suggestive photo array
also violates Art I, § 7 of the Utah State
Constitution (Due process); *ee also State
v. Ramirez, 817 P2d 774 (Utah 1991).
These statements concluded his argument
[9] It 'is well established that a reviewing
court will not address arguments that are
not adequately briefed. State v. Herrem
895 PJ2d 359, 368 n. 5 (Utah 1995) (refusing
to address defendant's state due process argument where argument entailed only superficial statement concerning Utah's unique
history and reference to another part of de
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fendant's brief); State v. Wareham, 772 PJ2d
960, 966 (Utah 1989) (declining to rule on,
issue where defendant's brief "wholly
lack[ed] legal analysis and authority to support his argument"); State v. Amicone, 689
?2d 1341,1344 (Utah 1984) (declining to rule
on separation of powers argument where argument was not supported by any legal analysis or authority).
In deciding whether an argument has been
adequately briefed, we look to the standard
set forth in rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. This rule states that
the argument in the appellant's brief "shall
contain the contentions and reasons of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented ... with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on." Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald
citation to authority but development of that
authority and reasoned analysis based on
that authority, We have previously stated
that this court is not" 'a depository in which
the appealing party may dump the burden of
argument and research.*" State v Bishop,
753 ?M 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (quoting Williamson v. Opsahl 92 IU.App.3d 1087, 48
IlLDec. 510, 511, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (1981)).
[10] In his brief to the court of appeals,
Thomas did rite to the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution, to article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution, and to the case of State v. Ramirez.
However, this is all he did. Analysis of what
this authority requires and of how the facts
of Thomas's case satisfy these requirements
was 'wholly lacking. The court of appeals.
also noted, "Thomas ignores several decisions
addressing proper challenges to photo array
cases." Thomas, slip op. at 3. While failure
to cite to pertinent authority may not always
render an issue inadequately briefed, it does
so when the overall analysis of the issue is so
lacking as to shift the burden of research and
argument to the reviewing court Because of
Thomas's lack of analysis, the photo array
issue was inadequately briefed and the court
of appeals was justified in declining to address it

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' holding that Salt Lake City v. Ohms
does not apply to the issuance of a search
warrant Issuing a search warrant is a core
judicial function involving ultimate judicial
power. We remand the case to the court of
appeals for a determination as to whether the
trial court's failure to suppress evidence obtained from the search constituted reversible
error. We further affirm the court of appeals' holding that Thomas inadequately
briefed the photo array issue.
HOWE, C J., DURHAM, Associate C J.,
and STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ.,
concur in Justice RUSSON's opinion.
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This case is befoi e us on i: emand from, the Utah Supreme
Court. £ £ £ State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1 9 9 8 ) . The sole
issue is "whether the trial court•s failure to suppress evidence
obtained from""'the [illegal] search constituted reversible error "
Id,, at 3 05. We hoi d that i t does not.
Because the invalid search amounts to a violation of a
federally protected constitutional right, "we will affirm,
defendant's conviction only if we can. say, beyond a reasonable
doubt, tha t defendant would still have been convicted
even
if the trial court had not admitted the improperly seized
evidence." State v. Genovesi, 909 P. 2d 916, 922 (Utah, Ct App
1 9 9 5 ) . The evidence seized pursuant to the search w a s the
baseball cap, sunglasses, gun, and bank bags with some coin
wrappers and gift certificates. Had this evidence been
suppressed, the jury had before it a positive and unequivocal
eyewitness identification from the store manager w h o had spent:
several, minutes studying defendant's face while in the store, and
had come .face-to-face with defendant several times while
defendant forced the manager across the store parking lot. ft
neighbor immediately next-door to the apartment at which
defendant had been staying directed the police to the apartment.

Upon arrival; the police we;. ~*
;, . ?.*-. defendant inside <-r d
confirmed the neighbor's report that a T.&XI matching r'
description given b> the Kentucky Fried Chicken employees was
there. Trie police guarded the apartment until defendant emerged,
Most importantly, defendant's voluntary and uncoerced confession
that he had committed the robbery was also befoie the ^urv
ComL
• vicer.ceo^.*:e. pursuant
:ne warrant
the overall s1 -.:jr - the prosecution's case, we hold that the
admission of the seized evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt because "the evidence that was erroneously admitted did
not significantly contribute to defendant's conviction and other
properly admitted evidence overwhelmingly established his guilt."
909 P 2d at 923
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,
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WE CONCH

Russell W. Bench, Judge

Quk&DW- Site*?*)
fc<Tudith M, B i11 ings, Judge

1
We note the exemplary conduct- of the police in this matter
and that the "error" could not have been reasonably ant:icipahitari
by either :;:•<- police c-r the rria^, court,
2. Because .: f - ..- disposition, */e ;.. ,ot reach the State's
argument that exclusion of the sei2**.i evidence is an
inappropriate remedy. See State v. Carter, 776 P. 2d 886 tUtari
1989). We find defendant's jurisdictional arguments, including
those styled -v •, "Motion/Memorandum for Appointment of Counsel,"
without merit and decline to address them, see idT f and issuance
of this decision renders defendant's "Motion for an Expedited
Decision of Appeal" moot. Lastly, even if we assume defendant's
"Affidavit for Change of Venue[] and Prejudice" is a proper
pleading, it is without merit and we do not reach the issues
raised therein. See id.

2
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The United States r. Ferreira.

, ; . \ law, designate the persons to fill these offices.
T , : ; Le the construction of the Constitution, then as
vu .:tiirr na ted could not act in a judicial character aa>
,, %.. as" a commissioner, because he was not appointed
- \ :,-, ?'r —,ient, everv thing that has been done under the
. •••
\*'S/,. and 1834, and 1849, would be void, and the
paviuuiiis heretofore made might be recovered back b\the United States. But this question has not been made:
nor does it arise in the case. It could arise only in a suit
bv the United States to recover back the money. And
/ 9~l *as the case does not present it, and the parties
l,<w
' -l interested are not before the court, and these laws
have for so many years been acted on as valid and constitute-rial we do not think it proper to express an opinion upon
i:. In the case at bar, the power of the judge to decide in
tne first instance, is assumed on both sides, and the controversy has turned upon the power of the Secretary to revise
it; and it is in this aspect of the case, that it has been considered by the court, in the foregoing opinion.
The appeal must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction,
ORDER.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the
record from the District Court%of the United States for the
Northern District of Florida, and was argued by counsel. On
consideration whereof, it is now here ordered, adjudged, and
decreed by this court, that this cause be, and the same is
hereby dismissed for the want of jurisdiction.
NOTE BT THE C H I E F J U S T I C E , INSERTED BY OltDER OF THE COURT.

Since the aforegoing opinion wa« delivered, the attention of the court lias
been drawn to the case of the United States v. Yale Todd.1 which arose under
Tl iict of 1792, and was decided in the Supreme Court, February 17, 17i>4.
J here was no official reporter at that time, and this case has not been printed.
It shows the opinion of the court upon a question which was left in doubt bv
the opinions of the different judges, stated in the note to Hat/hum's ease.
And as the subject is one of much interest, and concerns the nature and extent of judicial power, the substance of the decision in Yaie Todd's case is
inserted here, in order that it may not be overlooked, if similar questions
should hereafter arise.
The 2d, 3d, and 4th sections of the act of 1792, were repealed at the next
session of Congress by the act of February 28, 1703. It was these three sec
tions that pave rise to the questions stated in the note to llatibuni's case.
The repealing act provided another mode for takinp testimony, and deciding
upon the validity of claims to the pensions granted by the former Jaw; unii
by the 3d section it saved all rights to pensions which might be founded
1
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3on any legal adjudication," under the act of 1792, and made it the duty
the Secretary of War, in conjunction with the Attorney-General, to take
li measures as might be necessary to obtain an adjudication of the Supreme
irr, "on the validity of such rights, claimed under the act aforesaid, by the
srminaiion of certain persons styling- themselves commissioners."
t appears from this case, that Chief "Justice Jay and Justice Cushing: acted
n their construction of the act of 1792, immediately after its passage and
:>re it was repealed. And the saving and proviso, in the act of 1793, was
lifestly occasioned by the difference of opinion upon that question which
itcd among the justices, and was introduced for the purpose of having it
^rmtned, whether under the act conferring the power upon the Circuit
ins, the judges of those courts when refusing for the reasons assigned by
m to acts as courts, could leg-ally act as commissioners out of court. If
decision of the judges, as commissioners, was a legal adjudication, then
party's riirht to the pension allowed him was saved; otherwise not.
n pursuance of this act of Congress, the case of Yale Todd was brought
3re the Supreme Court, in an amicable action, and upon a case stated at
iruary Term, 1704.
he case was docketed by consent, the United States being plaintiff and
Id the defendant. The declaration was for one hundred and seventy-two
ars and -ninety-one cents, for so much money had and received by the deiant to the use of the United States; to which the defendant pleaded non
'in p.sit.

E

The case as stated, admitted that on the 3d of May, 1792. the de- ,- f
lant appeared before the Hon. John Jay, "William Cushing, and '
hard Law, then being judges hi the Circuit Court held at New Haven, for
District of Connecticut, then and there sitting, and claiming to be commoners under the act of 1792, and exhibited the vouchers and testimony
how his right under that law to be placed on the pension list; and that the
jes above named, being judges of the Circuit Court, and then and there
n<; at New Haven, in and for the Connecticut District, proceeded, as comdoners designated in the said act of Congress, to take the testimony offered
Todd, which is set out at large in the statement, together with their opinion
Todd ought to be placed on the pension list, and paid at the rate of two
d> of his former monthly wages, which they understood to have been eight
ars and one third per month, and the sum of one hundred and fifry dolfor arrears.
he case further admits, that the certificate of their proceedings and opin, and the testimony they had taken, were afterwards, on the oth of May,
2. transmitted to the Secretary of War, and that by means thereof Todd
placed on the pension list, and had received from the United States one
dred and fifty dollars for arrears, and twenty-two dollars and ninety-one
's claimed for his pension aforesaid, said to be due on the 2d of Scptcm1792.
Vnd the parties agreed that if upon this statement the said judges of the
•nit Court sitting as commissioners, and not as a Circuit Court, hail power
authority by virtue of said act so to order and adjudge of and concernthe premises, that then judgment should be given for the defendant,
Twi>c for the United States, for one hundred and seventy-two dollars and
tv-onc cents, and six cents cost.
he case was argued by Bradford, Attorney-General for the United States,
Hillhouse for the defendant; and the judgment of the court was rendered
:ivor of the United States for the sum above mentioned,
hief Justice Jay and Justice Cushing, Wilson, Blair, and Patcrson, were
ent at the decision. No opinion was filed stating the grounds of the deci. Nor is any dissent from the judgment entered on the record. It would
ii. therefore, to have been unanimous, and that Chief Justice Jay and JusCu>hin^ became satisfied, on further reflection, that the power given in
act of 17!':: to the Circuit Court a< a court, could not be construed to uivc
1
the judges out of court as commissioners. It must be admitted thaf the

SUPREUE COURT.
Barrow r. 41 ill.
justice of the claims and the meritorious character of the claimant* would
appear to have exercised some influence on their judgments in the first instance, and to have Jed thera to prive a construction to the law which its Iantruaire would hardly justify upon the most liberal rules of interpretation.
'liie result of the opinions expressed by the judges of the Supreme Court
of that dnv in the note to Unvaunt's case, and in the case of the L'mtid Statts
v. Todd, is this :
1. That the power proposed to be conferred on the Circuit Courts of the
United States by the act of 17D2 was not judicial power within the meaning:,
of the Constitution, and was, therefore, unconstitutional, and could not lawfully be exercised by the courts.
*i. That as the act of Congress intended to confer the power on the courts
as a judicial function, it could not be construed as an authority to the judees
composing the court to exercise the power out of court in the character of
commissioners.
o. That money paid under a certificate from persons not authorized by law
to pive it, might be recovered back by the United States.
The case of Todd was docketed by consent in the Supreme Court; and the
court appears to have been of opinion that the act of Congress of 1 TUG,
directing the Secretary of "War and Attorney-General to take their opinion
upon the question, gave them original jurisdiction. In the early days of the
Government, the right of Congress to give original jurisdiction to the Supreme
Court, in cases not enumerated in the Constitution, was maintained by many
jurists, and seems to have been entertained by the learned judges who decided
Todd's case. But discussion and more mature examination has settled the
question otherwise; and it has long been the established doctrine, and we believe now assented to by all who have examined the subject, that the original
jurisdiction of this court is confined to the cases specified in the Constitution,
and that Congress cannot enlarge it. In all other cases its power must be
appellate.

*-,-,
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*I\OBEKT R. BAKECNV, PLAINTIFF IX EDITOR, r.
NATHANIEL B. H I L L .

"Where the only exceptions taken in the court below were to the refusals of
the court to continue the case to the next term; and it appears that the
continuance asked for below and the suing out the writ of error were only
for the purpose of delaying the payment of a just debt, and no counsel appeared in this court on that side, the 17th rule will be applied and the
judgment of the court below be affirmed with ten per cent, interest.1

T H I S ease was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of
Louisiana.
Hill was a citizen of South Carolina, and sold two slaves to
Barrow, a citizen of Louisiana. Barrow gave his note for
£2.000, dated 12th of February, 1848, payable twelve months
after date. When due, it was protested. Hill then filed his
petition in the Circuit Court of the United States. Barrow's
1
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in violation of Utah Constitution.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Jeffery L. TAYSOM, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 930552.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 1, 1994.
Defendant was convicted in a Third Circuit, Salt Lake County, J. Patrick Casey.
Commissioner, for misdemeanor child abuse.
and he appealed. The Supreme Court. Zimmerman, C.J., held that statute empowering
court commissioners, upon consent of defendant, to conduct misdemeanor trials, impose
sentence, and enter final judgments of conviction delegated judicial power of State of
Utah to nonjudges in violation of Utah Constitution.
Vacated and remanded.
Greenwood, J., filed concurring opinion.
Stewart, Associate C.J., concurred in result.
Constitutional Law C=>60
Court Commissioners c=>3
Statute empowering court commissioners, upon consent of defendant, to conduct
misdemeanor trials, impose sentence, and enter final judgments of comiction delegated
judicial power of State of Utah to nonjudges
1. Child abuse, as defined in Utah Code Ann
§ 76-5-109(2)(c), is a clas, A misdemeanor
2. We note that the circumstances surrounding
our decision today are somewhat unusual This
case was argued after the retirement of former
Chief Justice Hall and before Justice Russon was
confirmed by the Utah Senate Judge Greenwood of the Utah Court of Appeals sat to fill the
vacancy on the court After Justice Russon s
confirmation, the court heard arguments in Salt
Lake Citx v Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994)
Although three members of the Taxsom panel—
myself, Justice Durham, and Judge Greenwood—
vvould vote to uphold section 76-3-31(6) of the
Utah Code, the decision to the contrary reached
by three permanent members of this court in
Ohms controls
3

- In Ohms, 881 P 2d at 853-55, a majority of this
court validated the past actions of commissioners

U.C.A.

1953, 78-3-31(6); Const. Ait. S. § 1.
Jan Graham, Atty. Gen.. Joanne C. Slotnik.
Asst. Atty. Gen.. Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
Charles F. Loyd, Salt Lake City, for defendant.
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice:
Jeffery L. Taysom appeals his 1992 jury
conviction for misdemeanor child abuse l and
the subsequent entry of a final judgment of
conviction and imposition of sentence by a
court commissioner. Taysom attacks section
78-3-31(6) of the Code, which empowers
court commissioners, upon consent of the
defendant, to conduct misdemeanor trials.
impose sentence, and enter final judgments
of comiction. According to Taysom. this
provision delegates "the judicial power of the
state of Utah" to nonjudges in \iolation of
article VIII, section 1 of the Utah Constitution. The Utah Court of Appeals certified
Taysom's appeal to this court pursuant to
rule 43 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Although I continue to adhere to the view
that section 78-3-31(6) is constitutional. Salt
Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 863 (Utah
1994) (Durham, J., & Zimmerman, C.J., dissenting), a majority of the permanent members of this court have concluded otherwise.2
Id. at 855. Accordingly, on the basis of
Ohms,3 we vacate Taysom's conviction and
under the "de facto judge" doctrine Under this
theory, the actions of a de facto judge are valid
unless a party objects to the "judge's" exercise of
power at trial State ex rel. Smith v Starke
Circuit Court, 275 Ind. 483, 417 N E.2d 1115.
1124 (1981) Under a strict reading of the de
facto authority doctrine, the defendant m Ohms
would not benefit from the rule of law set out in
that case because he never objected to the authority of the commissioner at trial. See id
Nevertheless, this court held that "it would be
unconscionable to depnve Ohms, who has sustained the burden of attacking an unconstitutional statute, of the fruits of victory " Ohms, 881
P.2d at 854-55 The majority relied heavily on
our decision in Labrum v Utah State Board of
Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 914 (Utah 1993), in
reaching this result In Labrum, this court held

SALT LAKE COUNTY
Deputy Cltrk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORDER

RICHARD DEE THOMAS,

CASE NO. 940903104

Petitioner,
vs.
UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS
Respondent.

This matter was randomly assigned to Judge Hanson who in turn
referred the matter to Judge Murphy, the presiding judge, in
accordance with Section 77-6-4, Utah Code Ann. Petitionees filing
invokes Section 77-6-1, et seq. , Utah Code Ann. for the removal of
members of the Board of Pardons. The statutory provisions invoked,
however, are applicable for the removal of justices of the peace or
officers of a city, county or other political subdivision of the
state.

Members

of

the Board

of

Pardons

are

gubernatorial

appoinrees and do nor fall within the category of officials who can
be removed under the statues invoked.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed with
prejudice and no referral for prosecution will be made.
Dated this

is

.day of June, 1994.

MICHAEL R.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

THOMAS V. BD. OF PARDONS

PAGE TWO

ORDER

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order, to the following, this

Richard Dee Thomas
Pro se
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
Utah Board of Pardons
448 East 6400 South
Murray, Utah 84107
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson
Third District Court
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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OZONE ALERT
Today is a voluntary no-drive
day in Salt Lake, Davis and
Weber counties.

• WEATHER, D-10
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Most WVC Residents Content
Survey shows folks
satisfied with police,
public works, image
BY REBECCA WALSH
THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE

WEST VALLEY CITY — After 61
years of watching history unfold west
of the Jordan River, 85-year-old Vern

Breeze figures it is time his hometown
moved beyond its inferiority complex.
"I don't tnmK we ought to be selfconscious anymore," Breeze said.
Apparently, most West Valley City
residents agree with him. According
to a recent Dan Jones & Associates
poll, most West Valley City residents
are satisfied — with police response
times, the city's 2-year-old fitness center, even the city's image.
They are complacent, even. Nearly
one-fourth of 400 residents polled in
June could not pick one major

improvement to make life in West
Valley City better. Another 19 percent
were unable to choose the "most important" issue facing the city.
Jones says that means they are
content. "Many people used to worry
about your image," he told City Council members Tuesday. "You couldn't
have gotten a better report card."
City Manager John Patterson was a
little giddy.
"This is phenomenal," he said.
"Time and again, people — CAVE
people, Citizens Against Virtually

Everything — question our focus on
big projects like the E Center, Hale
Center Theater, the fitness center.
"This poll shows we have stuck to
the knitting. We have stuck to what is
essentially the role of local government: It's public works. It's public
safety. It's providing services to the
citizens."
Since 1993, West Valley City has
hired Jones to survey residents on issues ranging from crime to recreation.
See WVC, Page D-4

